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PREFERENTIAL ALLOCATION OF SHARES IN
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS'
Sean J. Griffith'
Abstract
This Article investigates the preferential allocation, or
"spinning," of shares in initial public offerings. It begins by
examining the offering process and the incentives of
underwriters, issuers, and investors. Through this examination
of the participants and the process, it locates the harm of
spinning in the underpricing of initial public offerings. The
Article then seeks to identify precisely which participants in
the offering process are harmed by the practice and finally
evaluates the most appropriate means of addressing this harm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The millennium boom is over.' With the decline of the
stock market in recent years, the triumphal tales of newly
minted millionaires, early retirements, and government
surpluses have given way to the schadenfreude of seeing the
mighty laid low. The accusations and indictments surrounding
the likes of Dennis Kozlowski,' Martha Stewart,' and FrankQuattrone' now seem to suggest that the game was fixed, that
making money in the market depended not on how smart you
were but on who you were, not on what you knew but on whomyou knew. One of the stories emerging from the market during
this period and sounding similar themes involved thepreferential allocation, or "spinning," of shares in initial public
offerings.
An initial public offering of equity, or "IPO," is a
company's first sale of shares into the public market. Although
the company may already have a number of shareholders, whopurchased their stakes in relatively small, private financings,
the IPO is the company's first distribution of shares to theinvesting public, after which the shares will trade on a
secondary market, such as the New York Stock Exchange. By
the end of the 1990s, IPO shares had become an extremelypopular investment option.' New issues became so popular, infact, that investors were often unable to purchase shares in the
1 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 4, 6 (2000) (coining
the phrase "millennium boom" to refer to the increase in the Dow Jones industrialaverage, which "stood at around 3,600 in early 19941, but] had passed 11,000 [by 1999],more than tripling in five years, a total increase in stock market prices of over 200%").
2 See Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Ex-Tyco Chief Evaded $1 Million inTaxes on Art, Indictment Says, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at Al (describing
indictment).
3 Kara Scannell & Laurie P. Cohen, Martha Stewart, Broker Indicted:Homemaking Maven Pleads Not Guilty to Criminal Counts; SEC Files Civil InsiderCharges, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2003, at C1 (describing indictment of Martha Stewart oncriminal charges of securities fraud, conspiracy, and making false statements to federal
agents).
a Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Quattrone Is Indicted and Fresh DetailsEmerge, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2003, at C3 (describing indictment for obstruction ofjustice and witness tampering). See also infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
F See Susanne Craig, Allocations of IPOs: A Guide to the Game, WALL ST. J.,Aug. 29, 2002, at C1 ("Shares of most initial public offerings jump in value immediatelyafter they begin trading. In the heydey of the Internet boom, first-day pops of morethan 100% were frequent, though typically increases have been in the range of 10% to20%.").
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offering itself and were forced, instead, to buy in the secondary
trading market, often at vastly inflated prices.! This demand
for IPO shares empowered the underwriter - that is, the
investment bank managing the distribution of shares in the
offering - to allocate shares to investors on a preferential
basis.7 Or, more colloquially, to spin shares in the IPO.
Used in this context, "spinning" refers to the
preferential allocation of the right to buy in an IPO. An
investment bank engages in spinning when it allocates IPO
shares to specific individuals, such as company managers or
prominent venture capitalists, so that those individuals may
quickly resell, or "flip," the shares for a profit." Spinning differs
from ordinary allocation practices in a number of ways. First,
these allocations are directed to individuals rather than the
institutional investors that ordinarily receive the lion's share of
attention in IPOs.' Second, the underwriters direct spinning
See Terzah Ewing & Joshua Harris Prager, Many Are Finding IPOs Still
Out of Reach, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21 ("Small investors receive less than a
quarter of the shares in the average IPO, and the hotter the deal, the more scarce the
shares available to [the] small fry.").
7 This Article focuses on allocation decisions made by the managing
underwriters and other members of the underwriting syndicate, referring to these
collectively as the "underwriter." It does not address allocation decisions by the issuer
itself. Although an issuer's allocation decisions may also involve favoritism and wealth-
transfers, when compared to the underwriter, the issuer's allocation decisions influence
a miniscule proportion of the total offering and are often confined to a small directed
share plan or "friends and family" program. See generally Alan K. Austin, Allison
Bennington & Dorrian Porter, The SEC Cracks Down on Directed Share Programs,
INSIGHTS, Oct. 1999, at 2 (describing problems raised by directed share programs);
Michael E. Lubowitz & Erika L. Weinberg, IPO Participation Rights, INSIGHTS, July
2000, at 7 (discussing other participation rights given by issuers in their public
offerings).
8 See Meredith B. Cross & Christine Sarudy Roberts, Recent Developments
in Underwriting of IPO's: "Spinning" and Syndicate Penalty Bids, in 30TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 595, 597 (PLI Corp., No. 1084, Nov. 1998)
("Spinning occurs when an underwriter allocates shares of a new issue to the personal
brokerage account of an executive who then may flip the shares into the market for a
quick profit."). IPO allocations to individuals outside of the spinning context are often
encumbered by anti-flipping restrictions. See, e.g., Civilian Capital, Inc., Civilian
Captial's IPO Flipping Policy (describing one firm's policies and procedures in
connection with the flipping of IPO shares), at (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
9 As described in Part III.A.4, infra, institutional investors are favored
buyers due to their buying power and consistent participation in the market for new
issues. See Gregg Wirth, Syndicates Want IPO Tracking System Expanded,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Dec. 1, 1997, at 6 (describing the role of institutional
investors as a function of their buying power and repeat play). See also Kathleen Weiss
Hanley & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial Public
Offerings, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 240 (1995) (finding over a sample of 38 IPOs during the
period 1983-88 that "approximately 70% of the shares in underpriced offerings are
allocated to institutional investors"); Letter from Jane C. Sherburne, Deputy General
Counsel of Citigroup, Inc., to Michael G. Oxley, Chairman of the House Committee on
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allocations to particular individuals, usually those in positions
of power and influence, rather than leaving the syndicate's
brokers with the discretion to dole out individual allocations to
just anyone." Third, a spinning allocation, unlike an ordinary
allocation from the retail pot, is generally free from
aftermarket trading restrictions." Finally, spinning allocations
rarely, if ever, result in trading losses."
In addition to attracting a wealth of bad press,'3 the
practice of spinning has spurred a variety of regulatory
efforts." To date, most of the media and regulatory attention
has focused on the role of the investment banks, and this is
perhaps unsurprising. Just as issuers raise capital on Wall
Street, elected officials may seek to raise political capital by
Financial Services & John J. LaFalce, Ranking Member of the House Committee on
Financial Services (Aug. 26, 2002) (responding to Aug. 23, 2002 subpoena and stating,
"In the typical IPO, the percentage of offered shares allocated to institutional investors
generally ranges from 70% to 85% of the total shares."), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/citidocs_001.pdf.
'o See Michael Siconolfi, The Spin Desk: Underwriters Set Aside IPO Stock for
Officials of Potential Customers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1997, at Al ("A small number [of
shares], known as the 'retail pot,' are set aside for individuals, and spin shares
typically come from this pot."). See also RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 89-95 (8th ed. 1998) (describing allocation
authority over the "retail pot").
" Because underwriters are concerned that aftermarket "flipping" may drag
down the offering price, they typically force broker-dealers to agree, in the Agreement
Among Underwriters, to forfeit selling commissions if their clients flip the shares. In
order to protect its selling commission, a broker-dealer will ordinarily allocate only to
clients who agree not to flip securities and seek to punish those who do flip their
shares. See generally Civilian Capital, supra note 8 (describing one firm's policy
regarding flipping); Ewing & Prager, supra note 6 ("Individual investors are punished
more severely than institutional ones for 'flipping' stock, or selling it on IPO day for a
quick profit. The punishments typically take the form of shutting offenders out of
future deals for a set period of time."). Spinning allocations are unencumbered by anti-
flipping restrictions.
" Because it is not much of a privilege to buy into a losing investment,
underwriters only spin shares of hot offerings - that is, those for which there is
significant aftermarket demand. See generally Siconolfi, supra note 10 (describing the
practice).
13 See id. (breaking the story of underwriter favoritism in IPO allocations).
See also Don Bauder, Initial Public Offering Craze Created New Breed of Pirates,
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 18, 2002 ("The initial public offering, or IPO, craze of the
late 1990s was not lunacy. It was piracy - criminal piracy, in my judgment."); Lee
Drutman & Charlie Cray, The Top 10 Financial Scams of the 2002 Corporate Crime
Wave (The 10 Worst Corporations of 2002), MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Dec. 1, 2002, at
20 (complaining that through spinning allocations "already rich executives got even
richer on IPOs while ordinary investors were shut out of the profitable IPO offerings");
Michael Siconolfi, SEC, NASD Begin Probes of IPO 'Spin' Accounts, WALL ST. J., Nov.
13, 1997, at A3 (announcing commencement of regulatory investigation); James
Surowiecki, The Stock Spinners, SLATE MAGAZINE, Jan. 16, 1998 (comparing spinning
to bribery).
14 See infra Part V.B.
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exploiting Main Street's distrust of Wall Street." Similarly, the
many securities lawsuits filed against investment banks in
connection with IPO practices can be understood as another
kind of capital raising, recalling the answer attributed to Willie
Sutton when asked why he robbed banks: "Because that's
where the money is.""
Yet for all of the attention devoted to investment banks
in connection with IPO practices, the perspective of the banks'
clients - the issuers of securities - has been largely overlooked.
But it is the issuer's role in these transactions that matters
most. It is the issuer that is selling its shares in the offering. It
is the issuer the public is buying into, either in the primary
distribution or in the aftermarket. It is the issuer's managers
who receive spinning allocations, and it is the issuer's shares
that are subsequently spun to other managers of other issuers.
The failure to focus on the issuer's role in spinning allocations
has left a number of foundational questions unanswered: What
" See generally STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION:
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860 (1998).
The familiar modern rift between Wall Street and Main Street - between a
community of securities professionals pursuing its private interest while
certain that it is meanwhile essential to the public welfare, and a wider
political community suspicious of both the practices and the power of the
securities industry - is as old as securities trading.
Id. at 4. Senator Oxley and New York State Attorney General Spitzer have made
names for themselves as crusaders against Wall Street corruption, although they have
occasionally disagreed about the proper source and direction of reform. See, e.g.,
Corporate Governance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Technology,
107th Cong. 6-7 (June 2002) (testimony of Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney
General charging that it was "difficult to conceive of a more passive, or inadequate,
response" to the problems facing securities regulators than that proposed by Senator
Oxley through the House Financial Services Committee), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2004); Michael Oxley, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 3 (accusing
Spitzer of leading a "regulatory coup" that would result in the "balkanization" of
securities regulation).
'6 See Steve Cocheo, The Bank Robber, The Quote, and the Final Irony
(noting the doubtful origins of the famous quotation), at
http://www.banking.com/aba/profile-0397.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); see also
WiLLItM FRANCIS SUTTON, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1976) (describing a life of bank
robbery). Some of the private claims filed against investment banks in connection with
practices during the bubble market have reached a conclusion. See, e.g., In re Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (dismissing suits against Merrill Lynch for analyst conflict of interest because
"plaintiffs were among the high-risk speculators who, knowing full well . . . the
unjustifiable risks they were undertaking in the extremely volatile and highly untested
stocks at issue, now hope to twist the federal securities laws into a scheme of cost-free
speculators' insurance").
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is the perspective of the issuer on spinning? How does spinning
affect the issuer and its shareholders?
This Article examines spinning from the perspective of
the issuer, focusing specifically on spinning allocations
awarded by underwriters to the mangers of issuers that they
have taken or will take public. It seeks to account for why and
how spinning occurs, what purpose spinning serves, which
mechanisms make it possible, and what effect the practice has
on issuers and their shareholders. Each of these lines of
inquiry reveals a connection between spinning and the well-
documented phenomenon of underpricing in IPOs - that is, the
failure of new issues to be priced at, or even near, their
aftermarket value17  - a phenomenon which grew to
unprecedented proportions in the bull market of the late
1990s.1' As this Article will show, underpricing is both a means
and an end of spinning. Underpricing enables spinning by
providing underwriters with a ready supply of hot IPO shares.
But underpricing is also an end of spinning when hot
17 Underpricing may be measured in terms of percentage deviations from
aftermarket price or in dollar terms as forgone offering proceeds or "money left on the
table." Regardless of the metric, the offering price of IPO shares tends to be
systematically lower than the price at which the shares trade in the immediate
aftermarket. See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About
Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413 (2002) [hereinafter
Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table] (defining "money on the table" as the
aggregate proceeds foregone in underpricing). Persistent underpricing in the IPO
market may be taken as evidence that the market is not efficient. See, e.g., Jonathan A.
Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings,
48 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1995) (arguing that the IPO market is inefficient and that
securities law should be reformed to improve it).
18 See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed
Over Time?, at 12 (AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings, Dec. 3, 2002) [hereinafter
Loughran & Ritter, Underpricing Over Time] ("In the 1980s, the average first-day
return was slightly over 7%. In the 1990s, the average first-day return increased to
almost 15%, and then jumped to 65% in the internet bubble period."), available at
http:/ssrn.com/abstract=331780. In 1999, at the height of the technology bubble, there
was a difference of more than $27 billion between the aggregate offering price of IPOs
and the trading price of those issues on their first day in the aftermarket. Loughran &
Ritter, Money on the Table, supra note 17, at 413 ("During 1990-1998, companies going
public in the United States left more than $27 billion on the table, where the money
left on the table is defined as the first-day price gain multiplied by the number of
shares sold."). See also John C. Coffee, IPO Underpricing and Dutch Auctions, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 16, 1999, at 5 ("IPO underpricing . . . has increased at a hyperbolic rate.");
Alexander P. Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Pricing in the Dot-corn Bubble,
at 1 ("In 1996, first-day returns on IPOs averaged about 17 percent (median: 10
percent). In 1999, first-day returns averaged 73 percent (median: 40 percent) before
tapering off to 58 percent (median: 30 percent) in 2000."), available at
http://www.afajof.org/pdf/forthcoming/ljungqvist.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Robert
McGough & Randall Smith, Heard on the Street: IPO Issuers Don't Mind Money Left on
the Table, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at C1.
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allocations are used to induce issuer-managers to underprice
their own offerings." It is this double aspect of the relationship
between spinning and underpricing that animates the legal
and economic discussion in this Article.
From this Introduction, the analysis proceeds as follows:
Part II situates spinning in the context of the offering process
and reviews the underwriter's incentives in marketing IPO
shares. Part III considers spinning and underpricing from the
perspective of the issuer. Part IV addresses spinning from the
perspective of investors in the market for new issues and
investigates possible investor complaints regarding the
allocation of IPOs. Part V turns to the question of remedies for
those harmed, evaluating the solutions currently available
under both private litigation and public regulation before
proposing its own solution to the excesses associated with the
allocation of hot offerings. The Article then closes, in Part VI,
with a brief summary and conclusion.
II. UNDERWRITERS AND UNDERPRICING
Underwriters take on risk. In a firm commitment
underwriting, the underwriting arrangement preferred by
issuers,' the underwriter first purchases all of the shares to be
19 This Article uses the concededly inelegant phrase "issuer-manager" to refer
to the managers of companies issuing shares in public offerings. It also uses the term
"manager" throughout to refer to both officers and directors. Although this term
threatens to muddle various distinctions between the two corporate roles, officers and
directors have a common fiduciary obligation that is, for purposes of this Article, more
significant than any of their differences - that is, the duty of loyalty. The substance of
this duty, whether owed by directors as shareholder fiduciaries or by officers as
corporate agents, does not differ significantly. See infra Part IV.C (discussing spinning
as a breach of the duty of loyalty) and note 185 (describing the duty of loyalty of agents
owed to their principals). Moreover, the breadth of the term "manager" more aptly
captures the reality of the practice where spinning recipients often functioned as both
officers, frequently the CEO, and directors. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying
text (noting centrality of CEOs in allocation decisions).
20 Public offerings are distinguishable, broadly, by whether they are under-
written on either a "firm commitment" or "best efforts" basis.
In a firm commitment underwriting, one or more investment banking firms
agree to purchase the securities from the issuer for resale to the public at a
specified offering price. In a best efforts underwriting, broker-dealers do not
purchase the securities from the issuer but instead agree for a fee to use their
best efforts to sell the securities on behalf of the issuer at the offering price.
In re National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371
(Dec. 12, 1980).
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sold in the offering, then resells them to the public. This
arrangement exposes the underwriter to the risk that the
issuer's shares will not sell quickly, or worse, that they will not
sell at all. An issue that does not sell will increase the
underwriter's cost of capital,2' exacerbate opportunity costs,22
and harm the underwriter's reputation.2" These are sometimes
referred to as the risks of a "sticky issue.""
Underwriters are, of course, rewarded for bearing these
risks. They are compensated for their efforts by the right to
Because firm commitment offerings are preferred to best efforts offerings
by both investors and issuers, this article focuses exclusively on IPOs underwritten on
a firm commitment basis. See generally James M. Johnson & Robert E. Miller, Going
Public: Information for Small Businesses, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., Oct. 1985, at 38
(showing favorable comparison of firm commitment offerings to best efforts offerings).
" If the shares do not sell quickly, the underwriter suffers this cost in the
form of ongoing interest payments and opportunity loss. If some shares do not sell at
all, the cost of unsold shares represents a total loss to the underwriter.
22 See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS,
128 (16th ed. 1998) (defining opportunity cost as "the value of the good or service
forgone").
. Underwriters stake their reputations on the issues they bring to the
market, implicitly certifying to buyers that shares of the issuer are worth the offering
price. This is the "certification function" of underwriting, which serves to break down
the information asymmetry between issuers, who have incentives to misrepresent
themselves in order to raise capital, and potential investors, who are unable to
ascertain the fundamental value of the issuer. See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith,
II, Capital Raising, Underwriting, and the Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
261 (1986) [hereinafter Booth & Smith, Capital Raising]; Clifford W. Smith, Investment
Banking and the Capital Acquisition Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 16 (1986) ("[In
addition to a marketing function, the investment banker performs a monitoring
function analogous to that of bond rating agencies, of independent auditing firms, of
outside members of a firm's board of directors, and of insurance companies.") (internal
citations omitted).
If an underwriter fails to sell an offering, it will discredit itself in the
marketplace. Future issuers may be reluctant to use an underwriter that has
demonstrated an inability to place its clients' shares. Similarly, future buyers will be
reluctant to accept IPO allocations from underwriters who have shown poor judgment
in their selection of issuers. Any decline in an underwriter's prestige can thus signal
the beginning of a vicious cycle. The best issuers place their offerings only with the
most prestigious underwriters. If an underwriter's reputation declines, it may be forced
to underwrite less desirable offerings, which increases the risk of a sticky issue, which
may lead to a further decline in the underwriter's prestige and even less desirable
offerings at greater risk, and so on. See generally Seha M. Tini , Anatomy of Initial
Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988) (finding support for the
certification function); Glenn A. Wolfe et al., An Analysis of the Underwriter Selection
Process for Initial Public Offerings, 17 J. FIN. RSCH. 77, 89 (1994) (sampling period
1977-88 and concluding that "[bly emphasizing larger, less risky issues and
demonstrating sensitivity to market conditions, prestigious investment bankers
attempt to manage the risk associated with underwriting unseasoned new issues").
24 See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 209 (3d ed. 2001) (defining a sticky
issue as "an offering for which investor interest is so weak that the underwriters
require a much longer time to sell the issue than expected or, worse, they cannot sell
the entire amount").
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purchase the issuer's shares at an agreed-upon discount, often
seven percent, from the price at which the shares will be
offered to the public.' Underwriters may also contract with the
issuer for the right to sell additional shares if the offering turns
out to be popular,0 thus increasing their upside risk, or for the
right to abandon the offering under certain circumstances,
thereby limiting their downside risk.
In addition to these means of managing risk,
underwriters may also manipulate the price of the offering.
Two motivations for doing so - minimizing the risk of the
offering and maximizing returns through side deals involving
IPO allocations - are the focus of the following sections.
A. Underpricing as Insurance
Risky issues only harm underwriters if demand for the
offering settles on a price below the offering price, saddling the
The seven percent commission figure recently demonstrated such
consistency - uniformly charged by 25 different firms for IPO offerings between $20
million and $80 million - that it became the subject of a federal antitrust probe. See
Randall Smith, U.S. Ends Probe Into Underwriting Fees Charged by Securities Firms
for IPOs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at Cll (announcing the end of the Department of
Justice's probe into possible price fixing by underwriters). See also Hsuan Chi Chen &
Jay R. Ritter, The Seven-Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105 (2000) (arguing that the
seven percent commission rate is the result of implicit collusion among investment
banks). But see Robert S. Hansen, Do Investment Banks Compete in IPOs?: The Advent
of the '7% Plus Contract," 59 J. FIN. ECON. 313 (2001) (arguing that empirical evidence
supports efficient contract theory rather than collusion in setting commission rates at
seven percent).
This is the underwriter's "overallotment option" or "shoe." See generally
Raymond Hennessey, Deals & Deal Makers: IPO Outlook: Shift in IPO Issuers Spreads
Proceeds From Overallotments, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at C5.
Overallotments are an amount of shares set aside by a company that allow
for underwriters to purchase extra shares in the offering at the offering price.
For example, if a company offers five million shares in an IPO, it may set
aside 750,000 shares over that amount to cover overallotments.
Id.
27 Such clauses typically include exit rights for the suspension of market
trading, war or national emergency, as well as a material adverse change in either
markets generally or the issuer's business in particular. The underwriter's exit rights
in a firm commitment underwriting are limited, due in part to a pronouncement of the
SEC that extensive walk away rights are inconsistent with a firm commitment
offering. See First Boston Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,152 (Sept. 2, 1985):
[M]arket out clauses . . . [that] permit an underwriter to terminate its
obligations to purchase the offered securities from the issuer based upon...
an inability to market the securities... are inappropriate in the context of a
firm commitment underwriting. Such clauses place the risk of the success of
the offering upon the issuer and result in the underwriter participating upon
a "best efforts" basis.
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underwriter with a sticky issue, an offering it cannot sell. A
large spread between the offering price and the anticipated
aftermarket price insures the underwriter against the risk of a
sticky issue. Underwriters may underprice offerings to create
this spread and thereby reduce their risk.
This form of insurance is expensive. Underwriters
receive it only by foregoing additional sales commissions. At its
limits, reducing risk through underpricing would erase the
underwriter's compensation. However, underwriters probably
only consider underpricing as insurance at higher price levels,
where the increased risk of a sticky issue marginally outweighs
the expected return from an incremental increase in offering
price.'
Focusing on underpricing as insurance against a sticky
issue may give rise to the objection that insurance does not
seem necessary where an offering is oversubscribed.2 If
abundant investor interest is revealed during the marketing of
an issue,' there would seem to be little chance that the offering
will not sell, and the underwriter would seem to risk very little
by increasing the offering price. And indeed, in such situations,
the offering price is often adjusted upwards, above the initial
price estimate, or "file range. "  Yet even after this upward
adjustment, underpricing persists.'
B. Underpricing as Underwriter Welfare Maximization
In addition to providing additional insurance against
the risk of a sticky issue, underwriters may be able to increase
profits above their base compensation by engaging in
In other words, underpricing as insurance may not be a factor in deciding
to set the offering price at $10 rather than $1, but may become a critical consideration
in the determination of whether to move the price up to $17 from $15. In the later case,
the underwriter's additional gains of $0.14 per share sold may be outweighed by the
additional risk that, at the higher price, the shares will sell slowly or not at all.
An issue is oversubscribed when orders exceed shares issued. See Note,
Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1383 n.13 (1985).
When an issue of stock is oversubscribed there is every reason to believe the price of
the stock will rise when it is released for trading. See also infra note 210.
30 For more detail on the book-building process, see infra Part III.A.4.
3, The "file range" is the initial estimate filed with the SEC after the filing of
the registration statement, when the underwriter begins its book-building efforts.
32 See, e.g., Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public
Offerings and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 232 (1993)
(reporting that issues setting a final offering price below the file price range have
average first day gains of 0.6% while those setting a final offering price above the file
price range enjoy an average 20.7% first day premium).
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underpricing. This may seem contradictory since, as noted
above, underwriter compensation is a percentage of aggregate
offering proceeds, which are maximized by raising, not
lowering, the offering price. However, underpricing creates an
additional profit opportunity for underwriters by enabling the
practice of spinning.
Spinning improves the underwriter's welfare by
generating goodwill on the part of the recipient of the spun
shares. By granting highly profitable IPO allocations to savvy
business-people who well understand that nothing in this
world is free," underwriters can expect real returns on their
investment in goodwill. Of course, because one is not normally
grateful for the opportunity to participate in losing
investments, the creation of goodwill will only succeed if the
underwriter is able to churn out profitable IPO allocations -
that is, shares that can be sold into the aftermarket at a higher
price than the recipient paid for the allocation. Underwriters
assure themselves of a supply of shares for spinning by
underpricing IPOs.
Underwriters may spin underpriced IPO shares to
create goodwill in a number of ways, some of which are plainly
illegal while others take place in the dim interstices of law and
regulation. First, an investment bank may seek to use spinning
allocations to create goodwill among its brokerage clients.
Individuals who trade actively with the bank and generate
large trading commissions for the bank's retail brokerage
department may be allocated IPO shares as a reward for their
account activity and as an inducement to keep it up."5 When the
The primary example is lunches. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE'S
No SUCH THING As A FREE LUNCH (1975). However, the famous phrase apparently did
not originate with Friedman. See E.M. Hugh-Jones, Inquest on Nationalization, 62
ETHICS 169, 183 (1952) ("It was summed up, I think, by Professor Alvin Hansen in his
famous TINSTAAFL formula - 'There is no such thing as a free lunch.'").
Apart from foregone commissions, spinning costs the underwriter very
little since there are a number of regulatory barriers to price discrimination in public
offerings of stock. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.501(b)(3) (2002) (requiring disclosure of any deviation from fixed-price offering
practices); Harry S. Gerla, Swimming Against the Deregulatory Tide: Maintaining
Fixed Prices in Public Offerings of Securities Through the NASD Antidiscounting Rules,
36 VAND. L. REV. 9 (1983) (reviewing NASD rules on the subject). Selling a few more
shares to individuals rather than institutions should make no difference to the
underwriter since both buyers will pay the same price.
35 This seems to have been a common practice at Credit Suisse First Boston.
See, e.g., Complaint of the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC v. Credit Suisse
First Boston Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2416 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 2002) (No. 02 CV
0090) (alleging that CSFB engaged in allocation practices designed to increase its
brokerage commissions), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
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individual recipients of these allocations are also fund
managers at institutions, such allocations may run afoul of the
NASD's Free-Riding and Withholding Rules,36 which were
violated often enough in the late 1990s for the NASD to issue a
notice reminding its members that IPO shares could not be
allocated to fund managers. 7 Even when they are followed,
however, the Free-Riding and Withholding Rules do not
prevent shares from being allocated to the institutional fund,
rather than the fund's managers, to reward or induce regular
investment in the bank's underwriting activities or active
trading in the bank's brokerage department.' Moreover,
complr17327.htm. See also Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Deals & Deal Makers:
CSFB Officials Set Quota for Repayment of lPO Profits in Form of Commissions, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 10, 2001 (discussing highly formalized methods used by CSFB to generate
a return on its IPO allocations through brokerage commissions, and discussing a
meeting in which [a CSFB trader] told a hedge fund manager: 'You get $3 - we get $1.,
... In other words, the firm expected the manager to pay commissions to CSFB equal
to 33% of his profits on the CSFB-led new stock issues that he received."). Another
CSFB salesperson is quoted as saying:
They all had the same sheets .... [They] would say the account got X
number of shares, made X million in profits after 10 days, 30 days and 90
days. They would say this was your profit, and we want to maintain a ratio
[of brokerage commissions to IPO profits].
Id. See also infra note 40.
36 See National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., NASD Manual
Conduct Rules, Rule IM-2110-1(b)(4) (2003) (Standards Of Commercial Honor And
Principles Of Trade) (barring allocations of hot issues to officers who may influence the
investment decisions of any "institutional type account," including "a bank, savings and
loan institution, insurance company, investment company, [and] investment advisory
firm"). The current Free-Riding and Withholding Rule will be replaced by early 2004
with a new version, Rule 2790, which like the current rule, will bar allocations to
persons with investment authority for banks and other kinds of institutional funds, but
also like the current rule, will not prohibit allocations to the funds themselves or to
managers of business corporations, as opposed to investment funds. See Self-
Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48701 (Oct. 24, 2003)
(approving the new rule), available at http:/www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48701.htm.
37 See NASD Regulation, Inc., NASD Notice to Members (97-91), NASD
Reminds Members of Obligations Under the Free-Riding and Withholding
Interpretation (Nov. 1997). Lehman Brothers was one of the violators. See Diana B.
Henriques, Lehman Fined $100,000 in Sale of Hot Initial Stock Offerings, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1999, at C3. ('Lehman was accused of selling shares to investors who should
not have been allowed to buy, failing to adequately determine whether other
purchasers could legally buy shares, and inaccurately reporting to regulators the
percentage of each of the disputed offerings that had been sold to public investors.").
3 Inflated commission rates or needless portfolio activity may be a price that
brokerage clients are willing to pay for access to IPO allocations. See Andrew J. Chalk
& John W. Peavy III, Understanding the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings, 8 RES. IN
FIN. 203, 206 (1990) (explaining underpricing as a natural outcome of the pricing
process and arguing that 'the investor who receives an allotment in an IPO must pay
for the abnormal return . . . . [Because] the institutional framework precludes the
explicit use of a discriminatory auction,... the fee for IPO allocations is bundled into
other services provided by the investment bank."); Andrew J. Chalk & John W. Peavy,
III, IPOs: Why Individuals Don't Get the "Hot" Issues, 9 AAII J. 16 (March 1987)
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regulators have been generally slow to apply the Free-Riding
and Withholding Rules more broadly - to individuals not
associated with institutional investment accounts. 39
Nevertheless, the common institutional giveback of inflated
commissions to banks through brokerage transactions has
attracted regulatory scrutiny.0
(arguing that the favoritism shown to brokerage customers is evidence of an implicit
discriminatory pricing scheme, according to which investors who are willing to pay
inflated commissions or churn their portfolios are allocated underpriced offerings as a
kind of quid pro quo); Aaron Lucchetti, SEC Probes Funds' Commissions, WALL ST. J.,
September 16, 1999, at C1 (noting that "fund executives point out that higher
commissions can be justified by . . . the access they can provide to initial public
offerings"). The wealth transfer taking place here thus involves the following steps: (1)
the investment bank gets the issuer to accede to underpricing; (2) the investment bank
transfers the value of underpricing to the brokerage customer, and (3) the brokerage
customer transfers some of the value back to the investment bank in the form of excess
or inflated commissions.
39 In 1998, the NASD amended the rules but did not take the opportunity
specifically to address spinning. See NASD Regulations, Inc., NASD Notice to Members
(98-48), SEC Approves Amendments to Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation
(Aug. 17, 1998). Similarly, the SEC has not used its power over mandatory disclosure
to regulate spinning, asserting narrowly that the undisclosed receipt of a spinning
allocation by a fund manager may trigger disclosure obligations for the recipient, but
failing to assert that the issuer's disclosure obligations are affected by spinning. See,
e.g., In re Monetta Financial Services, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 33-7510 (Feb. 26,
1998) (stating that Rule 10b-5 and § 17 of the Securities Act require fund managers to
disclose their acceptance of spinning allocations to their investors). General disclosure
obligations relating to the issuer's plan of distribution are set forth in Regulation S-K
Item 508. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.508
(Plan of Distribution) (2002). However, these have not been interpreted to require an
issuer to disclose a manager's receipt of a spinning allocation on the basis that, without
an explicit agreement, there is not a sufficiently material relationship between the
issuer and the underwriter to require special disclosure. See Cross & Roberts, supra
note 8, at 599 ("The receipt of IPO shares from an underwriter by an executive of the
company, absent other factors suggesting a quid pro quo relationship, would not seem
to be a material relationship for purposes of Item 508(a)."). See generally HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., HANDBOOK: GOING PUBLIC, THE INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE
SYSTEM AND EXEMPT FINANCING § 3.13-3.14 (2001) (noting broad discretion of
underwriting syndicate, free from SEC intervention, to allocate an offering).
40 Suits filed by the SEC and the NASD have led to settlements with CSFB,
Robertson Stephens, and J.P. Morgan Chase in connection with discriminatory
brokerage pricing and IPO allocations. See News Release, National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., NASD Charges Robertson Stephens with Sharing in Millions
of Dollars of Customers' Profits in Exchange for "Hot" IPO Shares (Jan. 9, 2003)
(announcing settlement by Robertson Stephens to pay each of the NASD and the SEC
$14 million in connection with allegations that it wrongfully profited by charging
excess commissions in connection with the allocation of hot IPO shares), available at
http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release-03-001.html; SEC Litigation Release No.
17327 (Jan. 22, 2002) (announcing settlement between SEC and CSFB for $100
million), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl7327.htm; Randall
Smith, J.P. Morgan Chase to Pay $6 Million in the IPO Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21,
2003, at C5 (describing settlement relating to IPO allocations and brokerage practices
of J.P. Morgan's Hambrecht & Quist unit).
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Underwriters may also seek to use spinning allocations
to win the favor of politicians and government officials. A
recent illustration took place in Japan during the late 1980s,
when numerous Japanese political figures, including Prime
Minister Noboru Takeshita, received shares of Recruit Cosmos
shortly before the company went public and the aftermarket
price soared.' The apparent quid pro quo involved in these
allocations created a scandal that forced the Prime Minister
and his entire cabinet to resign."
In the United States, spinning allocations to corporate
managers have similarly raised the specter of bribery and
corruption. Allocations to corporate managers may be divided
into two types: allocations to managers of public companies and
allocations to managers of private firms planning a public
offering. Each of these practices raises distinct concerns.
Because managers of public corporations, especially
CEOs and CFOs, exercise broad authority over the choice of
investment bank when their companies engage in acquisitions
or capital-raising transactions, there may be considerable value
in establishing a relationship of goodwill with them. And
indeed, recent media accounts have documented numerous
such relationships, including those between Goldman Sachs
and Kenneth Lay, formerly of Enron, and Dennis Kozlowski,
formerly of Tyco,14 as well as those between Salomon Smith
Barney and the now-former CEOs of WorldCom (Bernard
Ebbers) and Qwest (Joseph Nacchio), among others.4' The
practice may have become so common that top managers felt
41 See Amy Borrus, The Recruit Scandal Bubbles to the Top, BUS. WK., Mar.
20, 1989, at 55 ("Recruit, a young company, sought influence in high places by selling
cheap shares in a real-estate subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos, to 160 top politicians,
bureaucrats, and business leaders."); Stefan Wagstyl, Takeshita Resists Party Pressure
to Quit Over Recruit, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1989, at 1-2 (reporting that Prime Minister
Takeshita received Recruit shares).
42 The Monsters Stalking Politicians' Dreams, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 1989, at
31 (describing the decision of Takeshita and his cabinet to resign following the
scandal). The Recruit Cosmos case resulted in several prosecutions in Japan, including
bribery and corruption charges against the chairman of Recruit. See Recruit Chairman
Faces Four-Year Term, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 30, 2002 (describing the government's case
against Hiromasa Ezoe, the chairman of Recruit Co., charged with selling underpriced
shares to a cabinet secretary in exchange for political favors to be carried out on
Recruit's behalf).
43 See supra note 13.
44 See Randall Smith, Goldman Gave Hot IPO Shares To Top Executives of Its
Clients, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at Al.
45 See Dan Ackman, A Harmonic Convergence of Sleaze, FORBES, Jul. 18,
2002, available at http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/18/0718topnews.html.
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entitled to allocations from their investment bankers.-
According to one banker, "[c]lients began to expect it as a
condition of giving us their investment-banking work.""7
This Article focuses on the second form of spinning to
corporate insiders - that is, an underwriter's allocation of
shares to managers of firms that are not yet public. Once again,
underwriters can be rewarded in many ways, but the
motivation for doing so is clear: "You pay them off and expect
you're going to get treated in kind when they do the
transaction."48
The most obvious way for a pre-IPO manager to return
the favor to an underwriter, of course, is to reward that
underwriter with a leading role in the firm's offering. Media
accounts of spinning have focused primarily on the quid pro
quo of future underwriting business." Moreover, a number of
investment bankers have discussed the practice in these terms:
What we're talking about is trying to solicit business.... What do
you think about taking them out to dinner? . . . We throw lavish
parties with caviar. Is that not trying to influence them, their
behavior? I suggest that it is .... [Spinning is] not illegal. It's not
immoral. It's a business decision.'
A well-documented recent example of such practices is
the "Friends of Frank" account at Credit Suisse First Boston,"
46 See Tom Hamburger et al., Salomon IPO Deals Provoke Congress:
Corporate Malfeasance Probes May Be Expanded, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at C1.
47 Id. (quoting an investment banker).
48 See Siconolfi, supra note 10 (quoting Robert Messih, a managing director at
Salomon, Inc., characterizing the banker's mindset generally but claiming that his firm
did not engage in spinning).
41 See, e.g., Michael Siconolfi, SEC Broadens 'Spinning' Probe to
Corporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1997, at C1 (discussing spinning as "an apparent
bid to get business from the executives' companies"); Michael Siconolfi, 'Spinning' of
Hot IPOs is Probed: U.S. Attorney Begins Criminal Investigation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16,
1998, at C1 (portraying spinning as "a potential bid to get future business from the
executives' companies").
50 See Siconolfi, supra note 10 (quoting Cristina Morgan, a managing director
of investment banking at Hambrecht & Quist). Sanford Robertson, chairman of
Robertson Stephens, expressed a similar view: "We try to run an honest business. I
don't see anything wrong giving a good client a new issue." Id.
51 The account was created by Frank Quattrone, now facing criminal
prosecution for obstruction of justice in connection with these activities. See Executives
on Trial: New Quattrone Trial on March 22, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at Cl(reporting that new trial date has been set after initial mistrial). In addition, the NASD
alleges that:
Quattrone's Tech Group sought to win and retain investment-banking
business ... by 'spinning' IPO shares, for example, giving access to hot IPOs
to select corporate executives who could influence their employers' choice of
investment bankers .... In making presentations to prospective investment
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which rewarded corporate managers with IPO allocations for
hiring CSFB and punished them, by removing them from the
spinning account, for failing to do so." Similarly, small
investment banks sought to use spinning to improve their rank
within the underwriting syndicate." It should be emphasized,
however, that whomever receives the IPO shares, the allocation
will generate goodwill only if the shares are sure to appreciate
in aftermarket trading - that is, only if the issue is
underpriced. From the underwriter's point of view,
underpricing is thus an essential element in the design and
creation of spinning allocations.
III. UNDERPRICING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ISSUER
The last part of this Article showed that underwriters
may seek to underprice new issues in order to insure
themselves against the risks of a sticky issue and to generate
goodwill. Underpricing will be worthwhile to underwriters on
the margin provided that the value of the insurance and
goodwill generated through underpricing exceeds the
commission losses of $0.07 per dollar of underpricing."
banking clients, the Tech Group held out access to IPO shares as an
inducement to the prospective client's officials.
See News Release, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., NASD Charges
Frank Quattrone with Spinning, Undermining Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to
Cooperate in Investigation (Mar. 6, 2003). See also Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam,
Buddy System: How a Technology-Banking Star Doled Out Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at Al. Quattrone has been compared to Michael Milken, the
human embodiment of the market collapse and scandal. See Peter Elkind & Mark
Gimein, The Trouble With Frank: Frank Quattrone Was the Top Investment Banker in
Silicon Valley; Now His Firm Is Exhibit A in a Probe of Shady IPO Deals, FORTUNE,
September 3, 2001, at 112.
52 According to a former technology analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston: "If
you take your company public with Bank X, you will most likely receive shares of Bank
X's next 5 ... deals. So it becomes something of a 'you scratch my back, I will scratch
yours.'" See Deborah Lohse, Tech Boom's Hot IPOs May Haunt Valley Execs: 'Spinning'
Gets Attention of Regulators, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sep. 28, 2002, at 1 (quoting e-
mail of Lise Buyer, but also noting CSFB's response that Buyer did not handle IPOs
and that her views may have been the result of news accounts rather than work
experience). See also Smith & Pulliam, supra note 51.
For example, after Needham & Co. allocated 1000 shares of a hot IPO to
Alfred Stein, Chairman of VLSI Technology, Stein demanded that the managing
underwriters assign Needham & Co. a large allotment of the VLSI offering. A banker
for one of the co-managers noted, "[ilf it were left to his doing, he would have paid
Needham more than the co-managers." Siconolfi, supra note 10.
54 This Article treats seven percent as the standard underwriter commission.
See supra note 25.
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For issuers, however, the net present value calculation
is not the same. Issuers lose $0.93 per dollar of underpricing.
Underpricing is thus much more expensive to issuers than it is
to underwriters. So why do they do it? The offering price, after
all, is the product of a negotiation between the issuer and its
underwriter. Why would the issuer agree to sell its shares for
less than they are worth?
This Part considers underpricing from the perspective of
the issuer. In doing so, it reviews three possible explanations
for underpricing. First, underpricing may maximize issuer
welfare in some non-obvious way. Second, issuers may
underprice because they have been duped by their
underwriters. And third, issuers may underprice because their
managers have been corrupted by the underwriters. In
evaluating these explanations for underpricing, this Part
applies insights drawn from the literature of financial
economics, which for decades has debated the issues raised by
underpricing in IPOs.'
A. Underpricing and Issuer Welfare Maximization
An issuer that has underpriced its IPO has, by
definition, failed to maximize the proceeds raised in its
offering. It is therefore hard to imagine how underpricing can
be a source of value for an issuer. A theory of underpricing that
is consistent with issuer welfare maximization must locate a
source of value for the issuer apart from the offering proceeds.
Moreover, in order to demonstrate that underpricing is a
rational choice for issuers, such a theory must show that this
alternative source of value exceeds the loss of the capital
foregone in the underpriced offering. Finally, a convincing
theory of underpricing as a welfare-maximizing activity on the
part of issuers should be able to account for the dramatic
increase in underpricing during the bull market of the late
1990s.,
The pioneering work was that of Roger Ibbotson. See generally Roger G.
Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 235 (1975).
Since Ibbotson's work, a proliferation of theories have been developed and tested as
explanations for underpricing. See generally Roger Ibbotson et al., Initial Public
Offerings, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 37 (1988) (surveying developments); TIM JENKINSON
& ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, GOING PUBLIC: THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON How
COMPANIES RAISE EQUITY FINANCE (2d ed. 2001) (surveying the literature and offering
data across global markets).
56 See supra note 18.
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This section considers four prominent theories that
portray underpricing as a wealth-enhancing activity for issuers
and, after evaluating the support for each, finds that none
provides a full account of underpricing from the issuer's
perspective, especially in light of the outsized pricing margins
observed in the late 1990s.
1. Signaling Effects
Issuers may seek to underprice because they value the
jump, or "pop," in their share price from the offering price to
the aftermarket price. A substantial pop on the first day of
trading may be valuable for its ability to signal to other market
participants that the issuer is a quality company.
Signaling mechanisms are valuable when there is an
information asymmetry among the parties to a potential
transaction, 7 and information asymmetry is perhaps the
greatest challenge facing new firms seeking to raise equity
capital. New issuers have private information about
themselves, including their business prospects and probable
returns on investment, but it is difficult for them credibly to
convey this information to outsiders who are justifiably
suspicious given the issuer's strong incentives to lie or at least
shade the truth in order to raise more capital. Underpricing
may thus operate as a signaling mechanism - that is, a means
credibly to convey private information about the issuer to a
suspicious public.
Underpricing signals may be directed at aftermarket
investors, who may reason from a pop in the issuer's share
price that other investors have researched the company and
deemed it a worthy investment, giving the investor an
opportunity to free-ride on others' information gathering.'
5' See generally A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL
TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974) (introducing the
economics of signaling through the example of a job candidate who, because she is
better informed about her capabilities than prospective employers, must find a set of
proxies to signal her worth in order to be hired).
In the trading market, price movements are often taken as an indication of
investor interest in a particular stock. Because useful company-specific information is
difficult and expensive to obtain, aftermarket participants often seek to free-ride on
each other's research efforts. Positive price movements, because they indicate that
other traders have researched the company and decided to invest, may thus provide
less-informed investors with a useful proxy for value. See generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984)
(describing this mechanism as "price decoding"). Underpricing thus mimics an implicit
certification by other investors of the worth of the issuer.
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Underpricing may also amplify the effects of the availability
heuristic and help to perpetuate the commonly-held view
among retail investors that IPO shares are a generally good
investment, at least in the short term. 9 In addition to stoking
the enthusiasm of aftermarket traders, a pop in the issuer's
share price on the first day of trading may send signals to
customers and creditors that the issuer is reliable and
creditworthy.' Aftermarket performance may also have an
impact on future equity offerings, in which issuers may seek to
recoup the capital foregone in initial underpricing.' Finally, the
signaling effects of underpricing may also be directed at the
financial press and general media in an effort to create
59 The availability heuristic suggests that decision-makers tend to draw on
those experiences that are most readily available when considering a course of action.
A systematic effect of the availability heuristic is the decision-maker's elevation of the
significance of memorable low-probability events, such as plane crashes or an IPO
appreciating over 200% on its first day of trading. See generally Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
Ever increasing investor interest in IPOs may build to an "availability cascade" in
which enthusiasm is fed back to the enthusiastic public, amplified, repeated, and
recycled again and again into more enthusiasm. See generally George A. Akerlof, The
Economics of Caste and the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q. J. ECON. 599 (1976)
(reputational cascades); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992)
(informational cascades). The notion of an "availability cascade" relates the availability
heuristic to mass culture:
[Ildentifiable social mechanisms govern the availability of information; and
through the mediation of the availability heuristic, this availability shapes,
on the one hand, judgments about the magnitudes of various risks and, on
the other, the acceptability of these risks. Simultaneously, the consequent
individual actions and expressions affect the availability of information.
There are thus two-way interactions between social outcomes and individual
cognitive processes. These interactions form an availability cascade whenever
individual uses of the availability heuristic increase the public availability of
data pointing to a particular interpretation or conclusion, and this increase in
availability triggers reinforcing individual responses.
Tumur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 712 (1999) (emphasis omitted); accord Robert J. Shiller, Speculative
Prices and Popular Models, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 55, 61-63 (1990) (describing as the
"impressario hypothesis" the view that underwriters use underpricing to create a hot
market for IPOs).
See generally Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure,
and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) ("A public offering of stock will improve
net worth, enabling the company to borrow capital on more favorable terms.").
61 According to this view, issuers maximize gains in a multi-period game. In
period one - the IPO - issuers underprice to signal their value, enabling them to
extract higher prices in period two - the subsequent equity offering. See Mark
Grinblatt & Chuan Yuang Hwang, Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues, 44 J. FIN.
393 (1989) (signaling effects from combination of underpricing and managers' retention
of equity); Ivo Welch, Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of
Initial Public Offerings, 44 J. FIN. 421 (1989).
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publicity for the company, potentially translating into an
increase in customers and clients. 2
Without denying that signaling mechanisms can be of
considerable value to issuers, the question remains whether
using underpricing as a signal is worth its cost in terms of
foregone capital. There are several reasons to believe, in spite
of the intuitive appeal of this explanation, that it is not.
First, it is unlikely that issuers underprice their IPOs in
order to increase their take in seasoned offerings. Aftermarket
pops do not last. Over time, usually within three years, new
issues are generally outperformed by comparable existing
firms.' This is the long term overpricing of IPOs.' Subsequent
issues, when they occur at all, are usually years away, giving
the market ample time more accurately to assess the value of
the issuer. In this interim period between the initial offering
and any subsequent offerings, a wealth of other, more reliable
signals regarding the issuer will flood the market, including
quarterly earnings disclosures and audited annual financial
61 See Elizabeth Demers & Katharina Lewellen, The Marketing Role of IPOs:
Evidence from Internet Stocks, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 413 (2003) (finding that post-IPO
growth in web traffic is positively associated with initial aftermarket returns from
Internet companies). See also Julia Angwin, Can These Dot-Corns Be Saved?: Profit
Eludes Priceline As Expansion Takes Its Toll, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2001, at B1
(discussing massive pre-IPO media coverage of Priceline.com).
6 Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J.
FIN. 3 (1991) (finding that IPOs significantly underperform comparable firms over a 3
year period and summarizing other studies also finding negative long-run IPO
performance). But see Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Really Long-Run
Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-Nasdaq Evidence, 58 J. FIN. 1355
(2003) (demonstrating, over a large sample of firm-commitment IPOs in the United
States from 1935-1972, that underperformance depends upon the method of return
measurement used and that under some methods underperformance disappears
altogether).
See Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule
19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1989).
New issues are overpriced and underpriced all at the same time, but it is the
overpricing that determines the ultimate outcome. The underpricing is a
selling technique, one that highlights the very short-term incentives that
drive this market.
How can a stock be over- and under-priced all at once? Strong new issue
markets are a creature of the late stages of bull markets when investors' wits
are dulled, and their appetites whetted, by the prospect of easy money. Some
new issues, notably at the beginning of the cycle, represent attractive values,
but it is a time when new and untested companies can raise striking sums. So
much so that it is often necessary to price their shares as a multiple of sales
not earnings. Convergent Technologies, for example, wound up with a market
capitalization of almost $600 million, though its gross revenues were only
about $13 million.
Id. at 998.
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statements. Future creditors and investors are likely to rely on
these signals instead and may not even remember the issuer's
first day pop.
More fundamentally, most issuers never return to the
equity market.' This makes underpricing utterly irrelevant as
a signal of firm worth in future capital raising exercises, since
those exercises are likely never to occur. If the initial public
offering is the issuer's only public offering, then there is little
sense in building aftermarket enthusiasm as a future
marketing technique. Indeed, the empirical evidence generally
discredits the relationship between underpricing in the IPO
and seasoned equity offerings."
Second, if issuers do not underprice in order to recoup
their costs in subsequent offerings, it is unclear whether the
signaling effects of underpricing are of any value at all. In
order for a signal to convey credible information to the receiver,
it must be difficult to imitate falsely. 7 As long as issuers
underprice in order to raise more capital in a subsequent
offering, imitation costs are high because issuers who certify
falsely will be found out before they can raise subsequent
rounds of equity and consequently will be unable to recoup the
cost of underpricing. However, if as most current evidence
suggests, underpricing is unrelated to subsequent equity
offerings, the cost of imitation may be reduced. If underpricing
is directed towards a more near-term goal, such as immediate
65 See generally Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of
"Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 1992 DUKE L.J. 977, 1014 (1992) (noting that most
companies make a public offering of equity only once and that "public offerings are
exceptional occurrences"); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
613, 647 (1988) ("On average, publicly held corporations issue only once every eighteen
years. .. ").
See Jon A. Garfinkel, IPO Underpricing, Insider Selling and Subsequent
Equity Offerings: Is Underpricing a Signal of Quality?, 22 FIN. MGMT. 74 (1993)
(rejecting positive relationship between underpricing and both probability and amount
of seasoned equity offering); Roni Michaely & Wayne H. Shaw, The Pricing of Initial
Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories, 7 REV. FIN. STUD.
279 (1994) (same). But see Narasimhan Jegadeesh et al., An Empirical Investigation of
IPO Returns and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 153 (1993) (finding
weak evidence to relate underpricing and seasoned equity offerings). Recent evidence
also suggests that issuers also underprice subsequent equity offerings, although by a
smaller margin than IPOs, further discrediting the argument that issuers use
subsequent offerings to recoup the costs of underpricing in the IPO. See, e.g., Shane A.
Corwin, The Determinants of Underpricing for Seasoned Equity Offerings, 58 J. FIN.
2249 (2003) (finding consistent underpricing for SEOs that is considerably less than
that observed for IPOs).
67 See SPENCE, supra note 57.
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aftermarket enthusiasm and media attention, imitations may
not be detected in time to expose them as false and react
accordingly. Because it can no longer separate good firms from
false imitations, underpricing should be severely devalued as a
signal.
Of course, it is still possible that retail investors and the
media will place more value on underpricing as a signal than
they should, but this does not imply that it is worth it to the
issuer to seek to capture that value through underpricing. If
retail investors behave truly irrationally, there is no reason to
try to signal anything through the offering price because these
investors' reactions will, in any event, be unanchored and
unpredictable. If, on the other hand, underpricing is somehow
connected with investor enthusiasm, issuers will have to weigh
the benefit of exploiting that connection against the cost of
underpricing. Ultimately, a media strategy based on
purchasing prime-time advertising may cost less than one
based on underpricing in the IPO.' Moreover, since there are a
number of other means available to the issuer to certify
quality, 9 issuers may find a beneficial signal that is less costly
than underpricing.' °
In sum, signaling effects probably do not explain the
phenomenon of underpricing in IPOs. This does not mean that
signaling effects are not extremely significant in situations of
asymmetric information or that investors, and even some
issuers' managers," do not sometimes interpret underpricing as
Attention from the financial media is not without value to the issuers, but
in noisy markets, such as the IPO boom of the late 1990s, the value of fawning by the
financial media is diluted by the fawning given to others. A manager's appearance on
CNBC sounds great, but the next segment will be devoted to another firm, and in this
way the attention given to all issuers degrades the attention given to any one issuer.
69 Available options include choosing a prestigious underwriter, conducting a
firm commitment rather than best efforts offering, and selecting a reputable auditor.
See, e.g., Booth & Smith, Capital Raising, supra note 23 (choice of underwriter as
signal); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,"
57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002) (choice of auditor); Gilson & Kraakman, see supra note 58
(role of investment bankers); Glenn A. Wolfe et al., supra note 23 (finding that
prestigious underwriters avoid smaller, riskier issues).
70 Some evidence suggests that a choice of a prestigious underwriter may
save the issuer money on underpricing. See Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter
Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN.
285 (1998) (associating underwriter prestige with less short term underpricing and
better long term performance). But see infra note 152 and accompanying text (finding
that high prestige underwriters also engaged in underpricing during the IPO boom).
7 Ryan and DeGraw polled the CFOs of newly public firms on their attitudes
regarding the offering process, conducting samples in both 1998 and 2002, and found in
the 2002 sample that over 70% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the
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a signal. The counter-evidence suggests only that the benefits
of underpricing as a signal are highly uncertain. Weighed
against this uncertain benefit, however, are the certain costs of
the practice - that is, the foregone capital that the offering
would otherwise have brought into the issuer's treasury." Is it
really plausible that in 1999, for example, issuers would have
agreed to $27 billion worth of underpricing for the sake of
uncertain signaling effects? Rational issuers confronting
certain costs and uncertain benefits are likely to seek other
alternatives.
2. Lawsuit Avoidance
Issuers might underprice in order to discourage investor
litigation in the event that problems with the company are
subsequently revealed. The lawsuit-avoidance hypothesis
asserts that underpricing is a source of value for issuers and
underwriters because it enables them to reduce litigation
costs. 73 Building on the fact that under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 liability for errors or omissions in a
registration statement cannot exceed the proceeds of the
offering," the lawsuit-avoidance hypothesis argues that
statement that "high first day returns are necessary to gain interest in the IPO." See
Patricia A. Ryan & Irv DeGraw, A Brief Comparison of the Oct 2000-June 2002 IPO
CFO Results to the 1996-1998 IPO CFO Results (working paper, on file with author),
tbl.7 [hereinafter Ryan & DeGraw, 2002 Study]; Patricia A. Ryan & Irv DeGraw,
Evidence From Chief Financial Officers Regarding the IPO Process: 1998 Study
(working paper, on file with author) [hereinafter Ryan & DeGraw, 1998 Study].
72 See Michel A. Habib & Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Underpricing and
Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 433
(2001) (modeling optimal issuer behavior with respect to underpricing and arguing that
issuers who seek to reduce underpricing will do so up to the point where the marginal
cost of reducing underpricing equals the marginal benefit).
73 See Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock,
43 J. FIN. 789 (1988) (arguing that underwriters and issuers have incentives to
underprice in order to reduce the probability that investors will bring a lawsuit as well
as the probability and magnitude of an adverse judgment).
14 See Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2000) [hereinafter
Securities Act] (defining damages as the difference between the amount paid for the
security, not to exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public, and the
value of the security when sold or, if not sold, when the suit was filed).
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underpricing may be used as a strategy to mitigate securities
law liability by limiting the proceeds of the offering."5
The lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, however, has been
largely discredited.8 The strength of its central insight, tying
liability under the Securities Act to offering proceeds, is not as
great as it may initially seem because (1) legal liability under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is tied to the price at which
the plaintiff bought the security regardless of the offering price77
and (2) claims are likely to be brought under both Acts."8 As a
result, the underpricing of an offering is not likely to deter
plaintiffs, who will nevertheless be able to bring Exchange Act
claims." In fact, IPO litigation does not correlate well with IPO
pricing,' and settlement practices suggest that underwriters
have very little to gain from underpricing as a means of
avoiding legal liability.8 Moreover, underpricing persists in
capital markets worldwide, most of which threaten the issuer
with significantly less litigation risk than U.S. securities laws
do.2
See Patricia J. Hughes & Anjan V. Thakor, Litigation Risk, Intermediation,
and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 709 (1992) (arguing
that underpricing is undertaken by "non-myopic" underwriters to reduce the direct and
indirect costs of litigation). See also JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 55, at 111-
12 & tbl.4.1 (summarizing the testable implications of the theory and the empirical
results).
76 Professor Alexander was one of the earliest and most forceful critics of this
hypothesis. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial
Public Offerings are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17 (1993).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000)
[hereinafter Exchange Act]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
78 Alexander, supra note 76, at 34.
79 More basically, Professor Alexander points out that "there is no legal basis
for suing because a security was priced too high - either in the sense that the open-
market price was lower than the offering price, or that the offering price was higher
than the 'intrinsic' value." Id. at 35. A decline in price may increase the risk of being
sued, as it does for all corporations with a keen following among the plaintiffs' bar, but
the price decline has absolutely no relationship to the probability that liability will be
found, contrary to the assumptions of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis.
"' Id. at 42. But see Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO
Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309 (2002) (testing lawsuit avoidance hypothesis and
finding that firms with higher litigation risk underprice more).
"' See Alexander, supra note 76, at 48 (noting that settlements are likely to
be paid from the issuer's directors and officers liability insurance policy and that
underwriters "hardly ever have to pay" largely because of indemnification provisions in
the underwriting agreement).
82 See JENKINSON & LjUNGQVIST, supra note 55, at 113 (noting that
"underpricing is a global phenomenon, while strict liability laws are not" and
summarizing the conclusions of studies finding underpricing in the absence of serious
liability risk in non-US markets). See also Alan L. Belier et al., Looks Can Be
Deceiving: A Comparison of Initial Public Offering Procedures Under Japanese and
U.S. Securities Laws, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 77 (1992) (finding underpricing in Japan
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Because underpricing has, at best, a tenuous correlation
with legal liability, underwriters and issuers would probably be
better off simply pricing the offering to demand and paying the
expected value of legal liability rather than underpricing the
offering in hopes of mitigating legal costs.'
3. Correcting Adverse Selection
Issuers may underprice to keep less informed investors
interested in IPOs. This theory of underpricing - the adverse
selection hypothesis - is rooted, like the signaling model, in an
information asymmetry in the offering process.' However,
unlike signaling models that focus on the information
asymmetry between issuers and investors, the adverse selection
hypothesis focuses on an information asymmetry among
investors.
The adverse selection hypothesis begins by assuming a
model in which most market participants - including the
issuer, the underwriter, and most investors - are uninformed
about the true value of the issuer's stock, while others have
perfect information." The assumption of an investor with
perfect information is meant "[tlo emphasize the informational
advantage which the market enjoys over the. firm and the
underwriter."" From this set of assumptions, the model
without an economically significant risk of legal liability); T.J. Jenkinson, Initial Public
Offerings in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, 4 J. JAPANESE & INTL
ECON. 428 (1990) (same, UK); Roger M. Kunz & Reena Aggarwal, Why Initial Public
Offerings are Underpriced: Evidence from Switzerland, 18 J. BANK. & FIN. 705 (1994)
(same, Switzerland); Phillip J. Lee et al., Australian IPO Pricing in the Short and Long
Run, 20 J. BANK. & FIN 1189 (1996) (same, Australia).
Alexander, supra note 76, at 59 (reporting the results of a study
incorporating generous estimates of litigation costs, including attorneys fees and
expenses, and a relatively conservative underpricing estimate, 9.87%, that finds
estimated total losses of securities law liability to be 23.37% less than the cost of
underpricing); accord Philip D. Drake & Michael R. Vetsuypens, IPO Underpricing and
Insurance Against Legal Liability, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1993, at 64-73 (independently
verifying Professor Alexander's findings and arguing that "underpricing the IPO is not
a very efficient way of avoiding future lawsuits").
As an explanation for underpricing, the adverse selection hypothesis can be
traced to Kevin Rock. See Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 187 (1986).
85 See id. at 190 (noting that the issuer and the underwriter give up whatever
information advantage they might have had through their securities law disclosures
and their estimate of an appropriate offering price).
Id. Rock repeatedly emphasizes the informational advantage of the
market, noting that "even though the firm and its agent know more than any single
individual in the market, they know less than all the individuals in the market
combined" and that 'the firm and its banker are at a considerable informational
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portrays IPOs in the absence of underpricing as a market for
lemons." Because some investors are well informed relative to
others, better-informed investors will subscribe only to
offerings of quality firms priced as a bargain, leaving less-
informed investors with the leftovers - that is, shares of poor
quality, overpriced firms. Over time, this adverse selection
process would teach less-informed investors a lesson: Do not
invest in IPOs.'
This is not a lesson that issuers and underwriters are
eager to teach since they may need less-informed investors to
sell offerings. On the whole, therefore, issuers and
underwriters would prefer to discount all IPOs, even those of
quality firms, in order to prevent uninformed investors from
being disproportionately harmed and therefore chased from the
market.'9 Uninformed investors, even if they continue to receive
systematically more low-quality issues than high-quality
issues, at least will no longer risk earning a negative return
from their IPO investments since all offerings are priced below
their aftermarket trading price. By underpricing all offerings,
uninformed investors can be kept in the market for new issues.
The first item to note in connection with the adverse
selection hypothesis is that it raises an interesting collective
action problem. The harm of adverse selection is borne by the
imaginary collectivity of issuers as a whole, while the rewards
of overpricing benefit individual issuers directly. While it may
be true that issuers maximize their collective welfare by
underpricing to guarantee the continued participation of
uninformed investors, individual firms make initial public
offerings only once and subsequent equity offerings rarely, if
ever.' As a result, these firms could maximize their individual
disadvantage relative to the market as a whole." Id.
"7 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (developing the
adverse selection model in the context of a used car market where buyers are at an
informational disadvantage with respect to sellers, which will lead to their receipt of
systematically lower quality cars, "lemons," and ultimately their withdrawal from the
used car market unless sellers provide some accommodation, such as a warranty or
return policy or deep price discount).
See Rock, supra note 84, at 188 ("If an investor finds that he receives none
of the underpriced issues . . . and all of the overpriced issues . . . [then he] does not
participate in the new issue market....").
89 See id. at 193 ("[T]o attract uninformed investors to the offering, the issuer
must price the shares at a discount, which can be interpreted as compensation for
receiving a disproportionate number of overpriced stocks.").
90 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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welfare by defecting from the collectively optimal regime and
pricing their offering as close to actual demand as possible.
Moreover, because all issuers will face these same incentives,
defection should become the dominant outcome, ultimately
causing the exit of the uniformed investor."
Fortunately, underwriters have different incentives in
this situation. Though they generally are not an unusually self-
sacrificing bunch, underwriters, unlike issuers, are repeat
players in the equity markets. Because their next offering may
be one in which the participation of uninformed investors is
needed, underwriters will be more eager to guarantee the
future participation of uninformed investors." If the adverse
selection hypothesis is correct, underwriters' pricing decisions
must respond both to the interests of uninformed investors,
who require underpricing, and issuers, who prefer to price to
demand in order to maximize the proceeds of their offering."
This may account for the consistency of underpricing and its
tendency, in most markets, to be set within a fairly narrow
range of between ten and fifteen percent below the aftermarket
trading price. 4
A deeper problem with the adverse selection hypothesis,
however, lies in the basis of its foundational assumptions
91 The situation thus becomes a "social dilemma" - that is, a game-theoretic
situation in which the interests of the individual conflict with the interests of the
collectivity. The most familiar of these is the "prisoner's dilemma," but other terms are
commonly applied to the same general problem, including "social traps," the "tragedy of
the commons," and "public goods/free riding problems." See, e.g., Toshio Yamagishi, The
Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 3 ADVANCES
IN GROUP PROCESSES 51, 53-57 (1986) (noting the many names under which the
general problem of individual/group conflict may be described).
See R.P. Beatty & J. R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986) (providing data to
support the proposition that underwriters may lose future business if they fail to
underprice offerings).
93 See Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and
Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1049 (1990) ("The uninformed investors will
only participate . . . if the expected value of participation is greater than or equal to
zero .... Therefore, [the issuing firms and underwriters] will set the offer price such
that the expected return to the uninformed investors is exactly zero."); Craig G.
Dunbar, Factors Affecting Investment Bank Initial Public Offering Market Share, 55 J.
FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (finding that underwriters lose equity offering market share if they
underprice or overprice to excess); Vikram Nanda & Youngkeol Yun, Reputation and
Financial Intermediation: An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of IPO Mispricing
on Underwriter Market Value, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 39 (1997) (correlating
overpricing with decreases in the underwriter's own share price, but failing to find any
such correlation for substantial underpricing, and finding that moderate underpricing
increases the underwriter's share price).
See Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table, supra note 17, at 433.
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regarding information. The model assumes: (1) whether an
issue will be a winner or a loser is knowable ex ante, (2) that
there is a piece of information capable of conveying this fact,
and (3) that some human being actually knows it. A skeptic,
however, might well ask exactly which piece of data will
accurately convey the success or failure of an investment
opportunity. 5 And indeed, although financial economists have
tested the correlation of numerous types of information with
the "value" of an issue," they have been generally unable to
find a piece of information that can reliably sort winners from
losers ."
It is possible, in other words, that the problem is not the
non-disclosure of such information, but rather its non-
existence. Even the price of a security in an efficient market
does not imply that all participants agree on the security's
value." Markets are aggregating mechanisms. Market prices
represent the blended decision making of all participants,
leaving plenty of room for them to disagree over the import of
various pieces of information and their relationship to value.
The information that is impounded in market price may reflect
investors "anticipating what average opinion expects the
average opinion to be"' more than it reflects investors' views
'5 See Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on
Flipping IPO Securities, 74 TUL. L. REV. 883, 892 n.48 (arguing that, contrary to the
assumptions of the adverse selection hypothesis, crucial information regarding the
issuer's prospects is generally not available to investors in IPOs).
96 These have included the maturity of the issuer, aggregate offering
proceeds, offering price, underwriting fees, and underwriter prestige. See E. BLOCH,
INSIDE INVESTMENT BANKING ch.9 (1989) (underwriting fees); Beatty & Ritter, supra
note 92, (offering proceeds); Michael J. Brennan & Patricia J. Hughes, Stock Prices and
the Supply of Information, 46 J. FIN. 1665 (1991) (offering price); Carter & Manaster,
supra note 93 (choice of underwriter); Habib & Ljungqvist, supra note 72 (underwriting
fees); Jay R. Ritter, The "Hot Issue" Market of 1980, 57 J. BuS. 215, 223, 237 (1984)
(suggesting that how well "established" a firm is - including such considerations as the
age of the firm, the book value of its equity, and its annual sales - is a proxy for value
and finding that there is more underpricing of less well-established firms and less
underpricing for better-established firms); Jay R. Ritter, The Long Run Performance of
Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3 (1991) (testing issuer age and other factors);
Sheridan Titman & Brett Trueman, Information Quality and the Valuation of New
Issues, 8 J. ACCT. & ECON. 159 (1986) (choice of underwriter).
97 If there was a piece of data that could reliably sort winners and losers, all
rational investors would be sure to learn it, which would destroy the foundational
assumption of information asymmetry.
98 This understanding of market efficiency follows the basic definition that
the price of a security in an efficient market equals the price it would have if all market
participants had the same information, but not necessarily the same wealth or
preferences. See William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 ACCT. REV. 23, 27 (1981).
JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 156 (1936) (providing the now-famous metaphor of market prices as beauty
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regarding a firm's "fundamental value."' ' Market analysts are
thus like Wilde's cynics - they know the price of everything,
but the value of nothing."0
If no one knows the "value" of a new issue - that is, if it
is impossible to tell a good issue from a bad issue - then there
is no adverse selection problem. All new issues are potential
losers. All investors are ill informed. And investors who are
otherwise relatively sophisticated will join those who are
generally unsophisticated in demanding an across-the-board
discount before they will buy.' 2 Although this is the same
outcome predicted by the adverse selection hypothesis, the
supporting basis is significantly different. There is no
information asymmetry among investors. Instead, there is a
degree of parity among investors - to overstate slightly, nobody
knows anything about the value of the new issue - and as a
result, the across-the-board discount on IPO shares is as much
for relatively well-informed investors as it is for ill-informed
investors.
Even if there is relative informational parity among
investors with respect to the value of an issue, investors may
be better informed than issuers and underwriters with respect
to their own idiosyncratic valuation of the issue. This
information asymmetry is the focus of the next section.
4. Rewarding Investor Disclosure
Issuers may underprice to provide investors with an
incentive to behave honestly when they express interest in the
issue. This is the insight of the investor-reward hypothesis,"
contest voting to show that the price reflecting supply and demand may be many
degrees removed from anyone's view regarding true value).
'0o See generally William KS. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market
is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986) (emphasizing James Tobin's
distinction between "fundamental value" efficiency and "information arbitrage"
efficiency). See also Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (tracking this
distinction but defining the terms as "allocative efficiency" and "speculative efficiency").
101 OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE'S FAN act I (Methuen 1985) (1892) ('A
cynic is a man who knows the price of everything but the value of nothing.").
102 See Hanley & Wilhelm, supra note 9, at 247 (1995) (finding empirical
evidence showing that "institutional holdings appear to be largely independent of the
degree to which an issue is underpriced").
103 Benveniste and Spindt are credited with first emphasizing these elements
in connection with underpricing in modeling what I am referring to as the "investor-
reward" hypothesis. See Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment
Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343
(1989) [hereinafter Benveniste & Spindt, Offer Price and Allocation].
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which is closely related to certain aspects of the adverse
selection hypothesis. Unlike the adverse selection model,
however, the investor-reward hypothesis does not require the
assumption that some investors have superior information
concerning the prospects or value of the issuer. Under the
investor-reward hypothesis, even investors who are completely
unaware of the fundamental value of the issuer still possess a
significant piece of information - that is, their own level of
demand for the issuer's shares. The investor-reward hypothesis
focuses on two critical aspects of the underwriting process: (1)
the book-building process, and (2) the role of institutional
investors.
After filing the registration statement with the SEC, the
underwriter begins to market the issue, pitching it in road
show presentations to major investors, primarily institutions,
and seeking to build a book of orders through buyers'
indications of interest."' At the outset of this process, the price
of the offering is estimated within a rough range and filed with
the SEC. By the end of this process, however, the underwriters
will have built a book of tentative orders reflecting each
investor's interest in a number of shares at a particular price
from which the lead underwriter will be able to gauge the level
of demand for the issue and thereby arrive at a more accurate
offering price that may be set within or outside of the
estimated range.'5
'04 Securities law prohibitions restricting offers of the security no longer apply
once the registration statement has been filed. See Securities Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §
77e(c) (2000). However, because sales of the security cannot be made until the
registration statement is effective, the expressions of prospective buyers, whether they
are treated as mere indications of interest or offers to buy, are not binding and may be
rescinded until the registration statement is declared effective. See Securities Act §
5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000).
105 See Ed McCarthy, Pricing IPOs: Science or Science Fiction?, J. OF ACCT. 51,
55 (Sept. 1999) (quoting an equity analyst's explanation of the road show: "The brokers
explain the offering and learn how many shares the institutions would take at various
prices - like sketching out a demand curve. The firms' top retail brokers also contact
their best clients to learn where the demand is with those investors."). The means by
which the underwriter arrives at the recommended price has been described as part
art, part science: "The scientific part of the pricing equation is based on numbers: an
issuer's historical and projected financial results, as well as valuations for comparable
companies. The art'is in the investment banker's assessment of market conditions and
investors' demand for the new issue." Id. at 52. Popular or oversubscribed issues may
result in an upwards adjustment of the file range. See Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer's
Guide to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates, 26 N.E. L. REV. 319 (1991).
If there is great enthusiasm for the issuer's securities during the marketing
stage of the offering, the public offering price will increase. If the market does
not receive the offering favorably, the public offering price will be reduced or
the number of shares being offered will be reduced to create greater demand.
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The accuracy of this process may be compromised by
investors' own strategic behavior. If investors know when they
are brought into the road show conference room that their
expressions of interest in the issuer will be used to set the price
they will eventually pay for the issuer's shares, they will face
strong incentives to curb their enthusiasm.'" If, for example, an
investor is actually willing to pay twenty dollars per share for
an issue that the underwriter has tentatively priced in the ten
to twelve dollar range, the investor is unlikely to reveal her
true reservation value to the underwriter and hope, instead, for
an allocation at a price set somewhere within the initial file
range.' 7 Because all investors face similar incentives, we can
expect them systematically to express less than complete
enthusiasm for the issue, resulting perhaps in an offering price
of twelve dollars, but not twenty dollars. Such strategic
withholding of investor preferences during the book-building
process can prevent issuers from maximizing capital raised in
the offering.
Fortunately for issuers, underwriters have some
leverage in the book building process. Most basically, the
underwriter can reward honesty and punish dishonesty.
Underwriters can increase allocations to reward investors who
bid high. They can also punish investors who submit low-ball
bids by cutting their allocation in the issue and, in extreme
cases, excluding them from the future pipeline of offerings. The
allocation mechanism thus enables underwriters to check the
Id. at 346. See also Hanley, supra note 32 (noting that greater than anticipated
demand results in increases from the file range, but not an increase up to the level of
aftermarket demand, resulting in the "partial adjustment" phenomenon, a form of
underpricing); Laurie Krigman et al., Why Do Firms Switch Underwriters?, 60 J. FIN.
ECON. 245 (2001) (arguing that in their decision to switch underwriters, firms pay
closer attention to the amount of proceeds raised relative to the mid-point of the file
range rather than overall underpricing). A foresightful underwriter may be able to take
advantage of the "anchoring" heuristic by setting an intentionally low file range. See
generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128-30 (1974) (discussing "adjustment and anchoring").
106 See Benveniste & Spindt, Offer Price and Allocation, supra note 103, at
344.
The basic difficulty facing an underwriter wishing to collect information
useful to pricing an issue is that investors have no incentive to reveal positive
information before the stock is sold. By keeping such information to
themselves until after the offering, investors can expect to benefit; they
would pay a low initial price for the stock and then could sell it at the full
information price in the postoffering market.
Id.
107 The numerical examples. used throughout this section are adapted from
JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 55, at 91-92.
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veracity of investors' indications of interest. In order for this
lever to work, however, investors must be repeat players and
the expected aftermarket return of all offerings must be
positive."
Institutional investors solve the repeat player problem
but, at the same time, create the pricingproblem. Institutional
investors are, in many ways, an underwriter's best friend. With
their large reserves of investment capital, institutions enable
underwriters to unload shares - i.e., risk - in much larger
chunks than they could by selling to retail investors.19
Moreover, institutional investors are consistent market
participants, constantly in search of profitable investment
opportunities. They are, therefore, the center of attention at
road show presentations and the overwhelming focus of the
underwriter's book-building efforts. Because they will keep
coming back for more, institutional investors are more
susceptible to the system of rewards and punishments that
underwriters employ through their allocation decisions.
Nonetheless, in order for this system to work, the
aftermarket return of offerings must be positive. Institutions
will not invest in losers, and more broadly, will not be
interested in IPOs on the whole unless they offer better returns
than the institution's other investment options. In this regard,
it is important to remember that IPOs underperform in the
long term and are relatively poor investments overall." 9 Maybe
some retail investors and day-traders are unaware of this fact,
but institutions, with their staffs of professional investment
advisors, should know it well. New companies are risky
investments. They have short histories, unproven business
plans, and no record of profitability. The underwriter may seek
108 See Benveniste & Spindt, Offer Price and Allocation, supra note 103, at
345.
Investors who regularly are given priority in IPO allocations by an invest-
ment banker earn abnormal returns. This gives the investment banker a
lever - namely, the threat to reduce an investor's allocation priority in the fu-
ture - that can be used to induce regular investors to be forthright with their
information in the premarket.
Id.
109 It may also be easier for underwriters to detect and deter unwanted
flipping by an institution rather than an individual due to the institution's size and
dependence on future allocations. See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 9 (describing system to
permit underwriting syndicate to track aftermarket trades and noting that "issuers
and their investment banks detest flippers because they can cause chaos in the
aftermarket. . ."). See also Hanley & Wilhelm, supra note 9.
"0 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing long term
overpricing).
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to certify quality,"' but promises alone cannot make long-term
losers into short-term winners. Institutional investors may
simply stay away."'
According to the investor-reward hypothesis,
underpricing keeps institutional investors interested in IPOs.
If underwriters can' guarantee repeat players a positive
average return by pricing IPO shares below aftermarket
demand, the underwriters can be sure that the investors will
return for more and, just as importantly, that the investors will
be susceptible to the system of rewards and punishments
embedded in the allocation process. In this way, although it
results in leaving money on the table, underpricing may be
more valuable to issuers than a system that leaves repeat
players indifferent to underwriters' allocation decisions.
Returning to the example above, if an investor values an issue
at twenty dollars, the underwriter may be able to induce her to
reveal her honest enthusiasm if the investor understands that:
(1) whatever aggregate demand, she will receive shares at a
discount, e.g., twenty percent, and (2) she will get a greater
allocation of the underpriced issue by bidding higher and
standing by her commitment."3 The offering may thus be priced
at sixteen dollars. When aftermarket demand is revealed at
twenty dollars, this offering price earns the issuer four dollars
over the initial file range, even though it left another four
dollars on the table. Everyone comes out ahead.1
4
The investor-reward model has considerable intuitive
appeal, and it has several testable implications that have
yielded empirical support. Studies have found that the
presence of regular investors and repeat play reduces the
amount of underpricing necessary to sell an issue."' Findings
. See supra note 23 (discussing certification function).
112 Reliable, relevant information such as a proven history of cash flows or
earnings is simply unavailable at this stage in the company's life. For this reason some
investment professionals, including Warren Buffett, avoid initial public offerings
altogether. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays Of Warren Buffet:
Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1997) (describing
Buffett's investment approach, which generally involves avoiding IPOs for the inability
to research fundamentals).
113 In spite of the fact that indications of interest are legally non-binding, it is
likely that investors who do not fulfill their preoffering commitments will be punished
in the same fashion as strategic bidders - that is, by being locked out of future
allocations. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
14 Or, more formally, this is a Pareto superior outcome. See generally
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 22, at 148-49, 266 (discussing Pareto efficiency).
"5 Ann E. Sherman, IPOs and Long-Term Relationships: An Advantage of
Book Building, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 697 (2000). See also Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan
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also support that institutional investors capture a large portion
of the rewards associated with hot IPOs and that, in exchange,
underwriters are able to call upon institutional investors to
participate in cold offerings as well."' Empirical evidence also
suggests, consistent with the investor-reward hypothesis, that
the offering price of issues revealed as hot during the book-
building phase is often adjusted upwards, above the file range,
but not all the way to aftermarket demand."7 This "partial
adjustment" phenomenon has been documented from 1980
through 2001.1"
In spite of the appeal of the investor-reward hypothesis,
two concerns limit its ability to explain IPO underpricing in the
bull market of the late 1990s. First, underpricing margins seem
much greater than the hypothesis would imply. In the investor-
reward model, each individual institutional investor
contributes a relatively small piece to the overall pricing
puzzle. Investors do possess information that is relevant to the
overall demand for the security, but their information is only
relevant to the level of their own idiosyncratic demand, which
is only useful when it is blended and weighed with the revealed
demand of many other institutions. Because each institution's
contribution is relatively small, the reward necessary to induce
this contribution should, it would seem, be correspondingly
small. Underpricing may thus be necessary, but this would be a
relatively narrow band of underpricing. Instead, average
underpricing exceeded seventy-one percent in 1999 and fifty-six
percent in 2000." Investors seem to be getting more reward
than they deserve.
Titman, Building the IPO Order Book: Underpricing and Participation Limits with
Costly Information, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002) (modeling the degree of underpricing
necessary to compensate investors for revealing information).
116 See Hanley & Wilhelm, supra note 9.
117 Hanley, supra note 32, at 233 (finding that "underwriters prefer to
compensate investors for truthfully revealing information by allocating a smaller
number of highly-underpriced shares rather than a larger amount of slightly-
underpriced shares").
1'8 See Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and
Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795, 1805 (2002) [hereinafter Ritter & Welch, Review] ("When
the offer price exceeds the maximum of the original file price range, the average
underpricing of 53 percent is significantly above the 12 percent for IPOs priced within
their filing range, or the 3 percent for IPOs adjusting their offer price downward.").
11 See Jay R. Ritter, Some Factoids About the 2002 IPO Market, at 4 tbl.3
(Jan. 2003) [hereinafter Ritter, Factoids] (finding average underpricing of 71.7% in
1999 and 56.1% in 2000), available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/
work papers/IPOs2002.pdf. Average underpricing for issuers making a partial
adjustment from the initial file range was even higher, approaching 53% overall and
reaching 119% in 1999-2000. See Ritter & Welch, Review, supra note 118, at 1806
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Second, in hot markets - as opposed to hot issues -
underpricing should be at its smallest. A "hot issue" refers to
an individual firm that is discovered, through the book-
building process, to have generated significant investor
demand. A "hot market" refers to a trading climate in which
many issues are hot. The investor-reward hypothesis suggests
that underpricing should be most pronounced for sporadic hot
issues, where investor demand is not immediately apparent,
but least pronounced in hot markets, where everyone knows
investors have considerable enthusiasm for IPOs. Contrary to
this reasoning, however, underpricing is often most pronounced
in hot markets, as it was during the hot market of the late
1990s, 12 1 where hyperbolic underpricing seemed to abound."'
In this way, although the investor-reward hypothesis
may explain consistent and narrow underpricing, it does not
explain the outsized underpricing frequently observed in hot
markets. Indeed, none of the issuer-welfare explanations can
explain the underpricing observed in the bull market of the late
1990s.
B. Agency Costs of Underwriting
Given the difficulty of explaining underpricing as a
welfare-enhancing activity for issuers, it is perhaps worth
asking whether issuers are simply being cheated. There is,
after all, a significant divergence between issuer and
underwriter interests in the offering and ample incentive for
underwriters to underprice the issuer's shares.
tbl.III.
", Calling the IPO market of the late 1990s merely "hot" now seems to
understate what Alan Greenspan famously referred to as "irrational exuberance" and
what many have acknowledged as a "bubble." See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, supra
note 1 (studying investor irrationality); Ritter & Welch, Review, supra note 118, at
1807 ("During the bubble, the IPOs of many Internet firms were the easiest shares ever
to sell because of the intense interest by many investors.").
121 See Jay R. Ritter, Big IPO Runups of 1975-September 2002 (compiling data
from CNNfn, Yahoo!, Securities Data Co., and Bloomberg) [hereinafter Ritter, IPO
Runups], available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/RUNUP750.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2004), noting:
The ten biggest first-day percentage increases are: the Va Linux 12/09/99
697.50%, Globe.com 11/13/98 606%, Foundry Networks 9/28/99 525%,
Webmethods 2/11/00 507.50%, Free Markets 12/10/99 483.33%, Cobalt
Networks 11/05/99 482%, MarketWatch.com 1/15/99 474%, Akamai
Technologies 10/29/99 458%, Cacheflow 11/19/99 426.56% and Sycamore
Networks 10/22/99 386%.
Id. at 1.
122 See supra Part II.
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Allowing these differences in interests and incentives
back into the analysis opens the way for a consideration of
underpricing in terms of agency costs. In a principal-agent
model, the imperfect matching of incentives and the inability of
the principal fully to monitor the agent may lead the agent to
defect from serving the principal's interests.123 In the context of
a securities offering, the issuer is the principal, offering its
shares through the services of an agent, the underwriter, who
appropriates the principal's wealth through underpricing. The
principal-agent model offers a plausible explanation for
underpricing insofar as the issuer cannot perfectly monitor the
activities of its agent.
Asymmetries of information and sophistication between
the underwriter and the issuer may undermine the issuer's
ability to monitor the underwriter. Underwriters recommend
an offering price on the basis of the information they gather
during the book-building process. Moreover, underwriters have
complete control over this information, giving them a
significant informational advantage over the issuer.12 ' Because
the underwriter thus has more price-relevant information than
the issuer, the underwriter is likely to have greater leverage in
the pricing negotiations.1"
In addition to information asymmetries, differing
degrees of financial sophistication may also give underwriters
an edge in the price negotiations. Pricing data is likely to be
presented to the issuer as the product of a complex valuation
analysis,"' employing sophisticated financial analyses familiar
to investment bankers but unfamiliar to the twenty-four year
old founders of an Internet start-up.1" Underwriters may then
123 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976) (applying agency theory to the relationship of participants in the corporate
entity).
124 See, e.g., David P. Baron & Bengt Holmstrom, The Investment Banking
Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive
Problem, 35 J. FIN. 1115, 1119 (1980).
125 See David P. Baron, A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking
Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues, 37 J. FIN. 955, 975-76 (1982) ("[I]f
issuers .. .are less well informed about the capital market, [they will] have a greater
demand for the advising function of an investment banker [and] be willing to accept a
lower price the greater is their uncertainty about the market demand for the issue.").
126 See supra note 96.
127 See generally E-DREAMS (Wonsuk Chin & Sam Pai, Cinema Forever, 2001)
(documentary chronicling the rise and fall of Kozmo.com and its young founders);
START-UP.COM (D.A. Pennebaker, Artisan Entertainment, 2001) (same, focusing on
GovWorks.com).
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propose an offering price as the result of this supposedly
precise and rigorous process, pushing issuers to adopt their
price recommendation as the one and only answer to the
pricing formula.
Of course, the underwriter's price analysis is no more
scientific than a car salesman's price on a used Toyota. The
outcome is easily manipulable depending upon the
assumptions that one builds into the analysis, and indeed the
assumptions chosen by the underwriter are dubious at best
since there is no obvious benchmark comparison for an as yet
non-existent security."8 An issuer could build a financial model
with alternate assumptions to support a different price. Doing
so, however, might require a greater degree of financial
sophistication than many issuers possess. Underwriters may
seek to exploit this asymmetry in financial sophistication in
pushing the issuer towards a suboptimal price.
A further reason for an issuer to accede to its
underwriter's pricing recommendation is the possibility that
underpricing has very little adverse impact on the issuer's
managers because they view it through the generally positive
frame of the IPO as a whole. Managers receive the bad news
about underpricing at the same time that they receive the good
news about the success of the offering and the jump in value of
their own shares."9 Simply put, at the same time the issuer's
managers learn that their company could have raised more
money in their offering, they also learn that the offering has
made them rich. The impact of this offsetting good news may
placate issuers and keep them from objecting to their
company's exploitation at the hands of its underwriters: "If
121 See McCarthy, supra note 105, at 52.
129 See Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table, supra note 17, at 420.
Loughran and Ritter cite the example of Netscape cofounder James Clark.
At the closing market price on the first day of trading, his shares were worth
$544 million, a 350% increase in his pretax wealth in the course of a few
weeks. So at the same time that he discovered that he had been diluted more
than necessary due to the large amount of money left on the table, he
discovered that his wealth had increased by hundreds of millions of dollars.
Id. As a result, Clark is not likely to have been overly upset about the underpricing.
However, the situation may well have been reversed, the authors imagine, if the
Netscape offering had not been such a tremendous success.
Now he should be mad: he has been diluted, and there is no offsetting good
news.... We conjecture that he would be much more upset at the investment
bankers for leaving $32.5 million on the table in this scenario than he was
when $151 million was actually left on the table, but was accompanied by the
good news that his wealth had increased by 350% in a matter of weeks.
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issuers viewed the opportunity cost of underpricing by itself,
issuers would be more resistant to severe underpricing. But
because it comes as part of a package that includes the good
news of an increase in wealth, there is much less resistance."130
This emphasis on the frame through which the issuer views
underpricing draws on the work done by Kahneman and
Tversky under the label of "prospect theory." 
131
Although a story of innocent entrepreneurs being duped
by evil investment bankers may be intuitively plausible and
morally appealing,132 issuers on the verge of a public offering
are probably not so unsophisticated. Companies are not born
one day and taken public the next.1 3 Along the way, they
develop some degree of sophistication or, at least, are guided by
sophisticated investors who often become members of the
company's board.' Even the notoriously poor business models
that entered the public market at the height of the Internet
bubble had sophisticated guides through the offering process.135
Thus, even if young entrepreneurs do not understand
130 Id. at 424.
131 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (developing "prospect theory" as a
qualification of the predictions of expected utility theory for individual decision-making
when confronted simultaneously with losses and gains). See also CHOICES, VALUES,
AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing decision
biases arising from a subject's cognitive frame of reference); Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir
Statman, Explaining Investor Preferences for Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253
(1984) (applying prospect theory to investors' dividend preferences).
132 In movies and popular culture, at least, employment as a corporate
executive or financier is a sure indication of villainy. See generally Robert H. Bork Jr.,
Commentary, Court Movies Don't Mimic Life; Culture: Couldn't the Demands of Lively
Entertainment Still Accommodate a More Balanced View of the System?. L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2002, at B9 (arguing that popular films "demonize the corporate world"); Arthur
W. Samansky, TV Commercials: The SOB in the Gray-Flannel Suit, WALL ST. J., Nov.
15, 1988, at 22 (stating that "executive-bashing has been a film maker's staple almost
from the day the camera was invented" and supplying a "totally unscientific survey of
recent TV commercials [that] finds [businesspeople] pictured as arrogant, uncaring and
unreasonably intolerant of subordinates").
133 See generally Ronald M. Loeb, Selected Articles On Going Public and
Public Disclosure Company Issues, May 1994, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW
WORKSHOP 1995, at 305, 310, 311 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. B4-7111, Aug. 1995) (describing the ownership composition of most
companies at the time of the initial public offering).
134 See id.
135 The path taken by bad business models on the way to becoming public
companies is the subject of numerous business memoirs. See, e.g., J. DAVID KUO,
DOT.BOMB: MY DAYS AND NIGHTS AT AN INTERNET GOLIATH (2001) (chronicling the
brief success and stunning failure of on-line retailer Value America); STEPHAN
PATERNOT & ANDREW ESSEX, A VERY PUBLIC OFFERING: A REBEL'S STORY OF BUSINESS
EXCESS, SUCCESS, AND RECKONING (2001) (describing the rise and fall of theglobe.com,
a company started by college students in a campus storage room).
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comparative valuation analysis, their backers probably do. And
because these financial backers have an interest in protecting
the value of their investment, they can be expected to prevent
investment bankers from exploiting the entrepreneur's lack of
financial sophistication.
In addition, the prospect theory account of issuer
cognition probably overstates the impact of managers' paper
gains. Being rich on paper may be better than being poor, but it
is not as good as being rich in dollars. In order to capitalize on
their paper wealth, managers and pre-IPO investors must sell
their shares, and this they cannot do for months after the
offering since they are typically constrained by lock up
agreements.'36 Unless they are betting that they will be able to
sell at a similarly inflated price six months down the road - a
risky proposition at best since the law of gravity of IPOs
suggests that they will fall back to earth before too long"' -
managers should understand that their paper wealth will not
soon and may never translate into real dollars. This suggests
that the sudden realization of paper riches may be good news,
but not great news, and that a rational issuer would discount
its value when comparing it to the real dollars, millions of
them, foregone in the offering.'38 Finally, empirical studies raise
doubts concerning the explanatory force of the basic principal-
agent model in the underwriting context,3 ' further suggesting
136 See Ronald M. Loeb & Brian Y. Shin, Negotiating the Underwriting
Agreement, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1994, at 189, 195 (PLI Corporate
Law and Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-7070, Aug. 1994) ("The
underwriters will require the selling shareholders to enter into 'stand-by' or 'lock-up'
agreements under which the selling shareholders agree not to sell shares (other than
those included in the offering) for a specified period, which may range from 90 to 270
days but is usually 180 days.").
137 See supra note 63.
'38 And again, even if entrepreneurs are overconfident or overoptimistic, it is
unlikely that their venture capitalist backers - those with the greatest experience in
taking firms public - would be among the duped in this psychological reckoning. See,
e.g, Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances For Success, 3 J. BUS.
VENTURING 97 (1988) (reporting that over 80% of entrepreneurs sampled believed their
chances of success were 70% or better and that one third of respondents believed
success to be certain).
139 The central argument against the simple principal-agent model is that if it
is to account for underpricing, then there should be no underpricing in situations
where there is no principal-agent separation between issuer and underwriter, as in
self-underwritten offerings where an investment bank takes itself public. However,
studies of self-underwritten offerings find, contrary to the implications of principal-
agent theory, that underpricing is as common as it is in traditionally underwritten
offerings. See Chris J. Muscarella & Michael Vetsuypens, A Simple Test of Baron's
Model of IPO Underpricing, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 125 (1989). Although this evidence
provides a strong counter-argument to the principal-agent model of underpricing, it
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that issuers are not simply duped by their bankers. There must
be something else going on.
C. Corruption of the Issuer's Management
If investment bankers cannot simply fool issuer-
managers into accepting a suboptimal offering price, perhaps
they can bribe them. °
Investment bankers in search of a commodity to induce
management concessions in the pricing negotiation may have
found the perfect item in spinning allocations.'4 ' By spinning
ought not to be taken as an absolute refutation of the model. Investment bank issuers
may have special reasons to underprice since, as underwriters, they ordinarily seek to
persuade others to do so. Therefore, an investment bank's failure to underprice may
harm its reputation and credibility with clients. See Ritter & Welch, Review, supra note
118, at 1805 ("underwriters may want to underprice their own offerings in order to
make the case that underpricing is a necessary cost of going public"). Also, investment
banks are not "monolithic institutions," and there may be intra-firm agency costs
favoring underpricing. See JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 55, at 88. If increased
trading commissions and other wealth effects of IPO allocations are distributed to favor
the bank's brokerage department, the brokerage department may lobby for
underpricing notwithstanding the fact that underpricing will not necessarily benefit
the bank as a whole. Managers may cede to these demands in order to keep their
brokers happy and productive, especially if underpricing enables the bank to generate
other non-transparent proceeds through the creation of goodwill.
140 Professor Coffee offers the following example:
Imagine you are the chief financial officer of a Silicon Valley company
that has just done a successful initial public offering (IPO). The offering price
was $ 20 per share, and the stock ran up to $ 28 on the first day. You are
annoyed that this one day run-up of 40 percent implies that underwriters
underpriced the stock .... When you express your dissatisfaction with the
pricing of the offering to the managing underwriter, he replies: "Don't worry.
We'll make it up to you." He also makes a vague reference to their opening a
discretionary trading account for you.
A week later, you get a phone call from the same underwriter, who
tells you: "Congratulations, we allocated you 2,000 shares in the Applied
Micro Digital IPO today, and it went up $ 6 on the first day, when we sold
you out for a $ 12,000 profit." ... You are also told that you are getting the
same deal that Bradford Jones, the well known venture capitalist who sits on
your board, has long had with the underwriter. (You later recall that it was
Jones who recommended this underwriter).
John C. Coffee, Jr., 'Spinning' for Dollars: IPOs and Allocation of Hot Issues, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1998, at 5.
14' As developed in this section, spinning can be distinguished from the small
gifts, dinners, and nights of entertainment common in business as different in kind as
well as degree. Analyses focusing on spinning as a mere promotional activity treat the
difference as one of degree rather than kind. Spinning is different, the argument goes,
because the dollar value is so much greater than the dollar value of greens fees at the
country club or a box at Yankee Stadium, and higher dollar value gifts are more likely
to influence management's choice. See, e.g., Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot
IPO - Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023,
2037-38 & n.34 (2002) (emphasizing the quantitative distinction and concluding that
"[tihe notion that there is - or might be - a difference between paying the greens fee of
a CEO/manager who accompanies the investment banker on a golf outing, on the one
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underpriced shares of other issuers to their counterparts across
the negotiating table, underwriters may hope to induce them to
accept underpricing in their own offering. "' Underpricing, in
other words, is not merely a necessary means to enable the
creation of spinning allocations, it is also a desired end of the
underwriter's allocation practices. Spinning is not a mere
promotional activity. Rather, it is an element of the bargain
between the issuer and the underwriter.
Spinning is part of a complex wealth transfer between
the issuer, the underwriter, and the issuer's managers. Wealth,
in the form of underpricing, is transferred first from the issuer
to the underwriter. Next, the underwriter transfers most of the
value of underpricing, in the form of spinning allocations, to
others. This value is later returned to the underwriter in the
form of increased brokerage commissions, investment banking
business, or other returns on goodwill. Part of the
underwriter's spinning activities, however, must be directed
towards the issuer's managers or they will not agree to
underpricing. "3 A spinning allocation to the issuer's managers
thus enables the underwriter to get more of what it wants
(underpricing) while the issuer gets less of what it wants
(capital). In this way, although the side payment is made by
the underwriter in the form of shares of other IPOs, the
ultimate source of funds is the issuer itself since the issuer
would raise more capital if spinning did not occur. Wealth
travels in a circle from the issuer (as underpricing) to the
underwriter (as a goodwill-generating opportunity and
insurance against a sticky issue) to the issuer's managers (as
spinning, in return for making the pricing concession). The
underwriter is merely an intermediary. Managers who accept
hand, and the underwriter's practice of spinning, on the other hand, seems rather
obvious"). This may be a sensible practical distinction, but it is not completely
satisfactory. Clearly, even small gifts are intended to exert some influence. If they were
not, why would underwriters give them? If it is influence that is the problem, then
should we not ban all such gifts in order to prevent them from influencing the issuer's
decision?
142 Linking spinning to underpricing strengthens the prospect theory
explanation. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. Spun shares can be
flipped immediately and are therefore as good as cold, hard American cash. If, as
prospect theory asserts, managers and pre-IPO shareholders glom the bad news of
underpricing together with the good, spinning should be added to the weight of the
good. Spun shares increase the girth of the manager's wallet, not just his or her
hypothetical net worth.
143 See Elkind & Gimein, supra note 51 (quoting a fund manager who stated
"stock would go into the hands of [the] venture capitalists and the managements of
companies that were going to go public next").
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spinning allocations participate in a transaction that by nature
and design prevents the issuer from maximizing capital raised
in the offering.
Empirical support for this theoretical account linking
spinning and underpricing is somewhat hard to come by. If the
receipt of spun shares exerts a significant influence on an
issuer's managers when they agree to underprice their offering,
then underpricing should be more common or consistently
greater in firms whose managers receive spinning allocations.
The ideal test of this implication would compare underpricing
in those firms whose managers have received spinning
allocations to underpricing in those firms whose managers
have not. A strong statistical correlation between the receipt of
spinning allocations and the amount or degree of underpricing
would provide firm evidence of the connection between
spinning and underpricing.
Unfortunately, these data do not exist.14 4 There is,
however, a second-best, highly unscientific way to perform this
test. Although the reliability of the information is suspect, it is
possible to construct, from press releases and other publicly
available information, a list of issuers whose managers
allegedly accepted spinning shares. Table 1 attempts to
construct such a list for the period 1999-2000 and includes, for
each such issuer, the offering price, closing price on the first
day of aftermarket trading, and the resulting margin of
underpricing.
144 Not surprisingly, issuer-managers who have been the recipients of
spinning allocations are not eager to confess it. And underwriters, who remain
concerned about their reputations and future business, have not been willing to
disclose all of the issuer-managers to whom they have spun shares or even to admit
that they engaged in spinning at all. The settlement documents of the recent
regulatory initiatives probing analyst conflict of interest have not produced a wealth of
data on spinning. Although SSB and CSFB were singled out as having engaged in the
practice, they were not made to produce a list of all issuer-managers who received
spinning allocations. See Securities Exchange Commission, SEC Fact Sheet on Global
Analyst Research Settlements, at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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Table 1: Underpricing and Spinning4 1
Issuer Offering First-Day Underpricing
Price ($) Closing (%)
Price ($)
iVillage 24.00 80.13 233.9
TheStreet.com 19.00 60.00 215.8
Vitria Technology 16.00 48.25 201.6
Portal Software 14.00 37.38 167.0
E-Loan Inc. 14.00 37.00 164.3
EBay 18.00 47.38 163.2
Phone.com 16.00 40.13 150.8
Interwoven Inc. 17.00 41.00 141.2
Razorfish Inc. 16.00 33.50 109.4
El Sitio Inc. 16.00 33.31 108.2
Microtune Inc. 16.00 30.13 88.3
A casual comparison of the underpricing of these firms to the
average underpricing of all firms for the relevant period reveals
larger average underpricing margins for those firms whose
managers are suspected of having taken part in spinning. '
Nevertheless, the data in this table should not be used
to draw firm conclusions, and caution is urged on several
points. First, firms listed as spinning recipients are also
included in the overall average of underpricing for the relevant
145 For information on issuer-managers and investment bankers having
allegedly engaged in spinning, see Complaint of NASD, Department of Enforcement v.
Frank Peter Quattrone (Mar. 6, 2003) (Disciplinary Proceeding No. CAF030007)
[hereinafter NASD Quattrone Complaint] (detailing spinning allegations against
CSFB), available at http://www.news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/csfb/nasduatt
30603spincmp.pdf; Press Release, House Committee on Financial Services, Oxley Calls
for Reform: IPO Investigation Shows Preferred Investors Profited Unfairly, Data Sheet
Attachment (Oct. 2, 2002) (detailing spinning allegations against CSFB and Goldman
Sachs), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/news; Charles Gasparino &
Randall Smith, Quattrone Faces Civil Charges on "Spinning," WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,
2003, at Cl; Matt Krantz & Noelle Knox, Some Execs Dispute Claim Of lPO Access;
House Panel Says Shares Used To Woo Business, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2002, at B3;
Randall Smith, Goldman Gave Hot IPO Shares To Top Executives of Its Clients, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at Al; Randall Smith et al., Something Ventured and Something
Gained? It Wasn't Just Top Executives Who Received Hot IPO Shares: Venture
Capitalists Did, Too, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at Cl; Smith & Pulliam, supra note 51.
Information on offering price and first day closing prices assembled from Ritter, IPO
Runups, supra note 121.
146 Underpricing averaged 71.7% in 1999 and 56.1% in 2000. See Ritter,
Factoids, supra note 119, at 4 tbl.3.
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period. Second, a list drawn from sporadic press accounts is
likely to be highly underinclusive with regard to actual
spinning activity, and as a result, many firms in the sample
used to generate average underpricing will be firms that have
also received spinning allocations. Thus, although the data in
the table permit a casual comparison of spinning recipients to
average issuers, it is not possible to use these data to compare
the underpricing margins of firms engaging in underpricing to
those that do not.4 '
In light of the poverty of direct comparative data,
confirmatory evidence must be sought in indirect empirical
studies. Proceeding in this fashion, Professors Loughran and
Ritter have argued that the link between spinning and
underpricing, which they refer to as the "corruption
hypothesis," is supported by three factors observed during the
severe underpricing of the late 1990s.'4  First, underpricing
margins expanded considerably during the IPO boom of the
late 1990s.'4' Second, there was also increased shareholder
turnover - or "flipping" - in the secondary market during this
time.'" Third, contrary to the usual conception of underwriter
147 It is worth noting, however, that these weaknesses of the data set make
the argument for a link between spinning and underpricing stronger, not weaker. That
is, even though the ratio of firms receiving spinning allocations to firms not receiving
spinning allocations probably includes at least some firms receiving spinning
allocations in the denominator, the result of the comparison still shows greater
underpricing for firms suspected of having received spinning allocations over a broad
set of those that may or may not have.
148 See Loughran & Ritter, Underpricing Over Time, supra note 18, at 5 ("The
corruption hypothesis asserts that decision-makers are willing to hire underwriters
with a history of underpricing due to the side payments that the decision-makers
receive.").
149 Data from 1980 through 1994 suggest that IPO underpricing, while
common, was typically quite narrow, within the range that might have been predicted
by hypotheses focusing on the need to reward investors for disclosure. Average
underpricing from 1980-1989 was 7.4%, with median underpricing at 1.9%, but rose
from 1990-1998 to 14.8%, with a median of 7.8%. See id. at 41-42 tbl.1 & tbl.2.
Moreover, in 1999 and 2000, average underpricing shot to 65%, with a median of
32.3%. Id. at 40-41. The average underpricing of each year from 1995 through 2000
was higher than any one year from 1981 through 1994. Id. at 13. Meanwhile, total
dollars left on the table jumped to an average of $79 million per offering, up from $9.3
million in 1990-1998 and $2.6 million in 1980-1989. See id. at 40 tbl.1. All of this data
supports a radical increase in underpricing in the late 1990s.
1 In the 1980s only 1.6% of IPOs had greater than 100% turnover. From
1990 through 1998, this percentage climbed to 23.6%, and by 1999-2000, 74.7% of IPOs
had a turnover rate greater than 100%. Turnover increased as average first day
returns, or underpricing, increased. Offerings that returned between 10% and 60% had
average turnover of 84.7% across the sample periods, but 137.9% turnover in 1999-
2000, and offerings returning more than 60% in first day trading experienced 177.6%
turnover across periods, but 200.9% turnover in 1999-2000. See id. at 45 tbl.5. (defining
turnover as "first-day CRSP trading volume divided by the number of shares issued").
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reputation,'5 ' prestigious underwriters increasingly engaged in
underpricing."'
These three factors taken together, Loughran and Ritter
argue, support the corruption hypothesis. The correlated
increase in both underpricing and shareholder turnover
suggests that the privileged recipients of hot IPO allocations
seek to sell quickly, while the shares are still hot. At the same
time, the increase in underpricing by prestigious investment
banks suggests that issuers not only accepted significant
underpricing margins but also sought them out. According to
Loughran and Ritter, the allocation of hot IPO shares to the
personal brokerage accounts of venture capitalists and
managers of the issuer "gives these decision-makers an
incentive to choose a lead underwriter with a reputation for
leaving money on the table in IPOs." " The practice increased
as the number of hot IPOs in the market increased and as
other management teams sought to enrich themselves with
spinning allocations." In other words, the practice increased as
151 The generally held view is that underwriters harm their reputations by
underpricing their offerings. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 105, at 56 ("Underpricing
costs the company substantial sums and can damage the investment banker's
reputation."); accord Baron & Holmstrom, supra note 124, at 1117 ("a banker that
continually prices new issues 'lower' than the industry norm is likely to lose some
market share").
152 In the 1980s, the average underpricing of offerings by high prestige
underwriters, at 5.1%, was almost half that of low prestige underwriters, at 9.1%.
From 1990-1998, the relationship had already reversed itself, with high prestige
underwriters underpricing at an average of 15.9% and low prestige underwriters
underpricing at 12.9%. As with underpricing and flipping, in 1999-2000, the
relationship of underwriter prestige and underpricing became extreme. High prestige
underwriters offered shares underpriced by an average of 71.9%, while low prestige
underwriters underpriced by half as much, 35.1%. Median underpricing by high
prestige underwriters in 1999-2000 was 37.5% while. it was 12.2% for low prestige
underwriters. By the end of 2000, underwriters no longer seemed to fear damage to
their reputation from engaging in extreme underpricing. See Loughran & Ritter,
Underpricing Over Time, supra note 18, at 47 tbl.7; accord Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo
Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON.
545, 584 (1996) ("We find that higher-quality underwriters underpriced more,
especially among smaller firms.") (emphasis omitted). The categories "high prestige"
and "low prestige" are based on scores earned on the scale developed by Carter and
Manaster. See Richard B. Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and
Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045 (1990) (developing a nine point scale to
measure underwriter prestige). The prestige of underwriters can also be gleaned by
their place in a typical "tombstone" advertisement. See id. at 1055. See generally
Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run
Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285 (1998).
153 Loughran & Ritter, Underpricing Over Time, supra note 18, at 30.
1 As more hot IPOs became available, the exchange value of the IPO
allocation increased:
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more issuer-managers demanded free money, which bred an
environment where more issuer-managers were willing create
it by underpricing their own issue.
Further empirical support for a version of the corruption
hypothesis is offered by Professors Ljungqvist and Wilhelm,
who demonstrate an inverse relationship between underpricing
and insider ownership. '55 In their words:
Standard principal-agent theories predict that agents will expend
less effort in bargaining and monitoring on behalf of their principals
when the agents' stake in the transaction is smaller. ... [Consistent
with this prediction,] underpricing is significantly lower when
insider ownership stakes are larger and less fragmented and when
insiders sell more shares at the offer price."
Decreased insider ownership suggests decreased manager
incentives to monitor the pricing process. Spinning represents
a further disincentive for managers to police the efficient
pricing of the firm's IPO.
This mix of direct and indirect empirical data supports
the link between spinning and underpricing that this Article
has sought to establish. Asserting this link requires neither
strong position (1) that spinning is a complete explanation for
underpricing nor (2) that underpricing is the only reason
underwriters engage in spinning. As noted above, there are
various explanations for underpricing, and spinning is
consistent with many of them.5' Moreover, as also noted, there
may be any number of possible quid pro quo arrangements
used by underwriters to generate goodwill through spinning."
Underwriters may spin shares to please their brokerage clients
or, even, to tip their doormen and mail carriers at Christmas.
This Article claims only that one important constituency for
spun shares is the management of issuers that the
underwriters will take or have taken public, and that one of the
In the 1980s, relatively little money was left on the table in IPOs because
valuations were low .... When there were few hot IPOs to hand out, IPOs
were not a good currency to use to influence decision-makers. As IPO
underpricing increased in the 1990s, however, the ability to use hot IPOs to
reward decision-makers resulted in the decision-makers seeking out
underwriters with reputations for leaving money on the table, rather than
avoiding these underwriters.
Id. at 30.
155 See Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 18.
16 Id. at 2.
157 See supra Part III.A-E.
,8 See supra Part II.A.
20041
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
reasons for these allocations is to appease managers whose own
offerings have been or will be underpriced.
IV. INVESTOR HARM
This Article has thus far considered spinning as a
benefit to underwriters and, through its link to underpricing,
as a cost to issuers. It will now turn to the question of how
spinning and underpricing affect investors.
This Part examines three possible investor complaints
concerning the practice of spinning. First, investors may
complain that spinning harms them by making it harder, or
more expensive, to become shareholders of the issuer. Second,
because spinning allocations are made primarily to corporate
managers,'59 shareholders of that company may claim that the
benefit of the manager's spinning allocation properly belongs to
the corporation, to be shared by all of its shareholders, rather
than to the individual manager alone. Third and finally,
investors may be harmed if managers breach their duties to the
corporation as a result of the conflict of interest created by
their receipt of spinning allocations.
A. Fairness and Investment Allocations
One of the most common complaints about the IPO
allocation process in the hot issue market of the 1990s was that
underwriters routinely passed over individual investors,
instead allocating hot offerings to institutional investors and
preferred retail clients." Revelations about the practice of
spinning, because it involves the favoritism of certain wealthy
and well-connected individuals over public investors generally,
added fuel to these fires.'' Public outrage at spinning may thus
reduce to the simple fact that ordinary public investors do not
159 See Siconolfi, supra note 10.
'6 See, e.g, Evan I. Schwartz, The Great IPO Swindle, INDUSTRY STANDARD,
Mar. 20, 2000 (lamenting the individual investor's inability to receive hot IPO
allocations and estimating the odds of receiving such an allocation at 1000 to 1). See
also The Osgood File: WorldCom's Bernie Ebbers and Four Other Chief Execs Charged
for Spinning IPOs (CBS News Radio Broadcast, Oct. 1, 2002) ("The P in IPO stands for
public. But sometimes by the time the public is aware of an initial public offering, it's
already subscribed to, allocated to somebody else. Sometimes it's because of what Wall
Street calls spinning. A form of, 'You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,' under
which executives of corporation[s] that bring investment bank[s a lot of business are
personally rewarded."), available at 2002 WL 4625546.
161 See generally supra note 13 (expressing public contempt for the practice).
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benefit from it. Preferential allocation is, in other words,
further evidence that the capital-raising process is indifferent
to the interests of the individual investor. This sentiment is
amply reflected in the statements of those politicians and
regulators who have campaigned as champions of the
individual investor.""
It is nevertheless unclear that the individual investor
should have a greater role in public offerings. The shape of IPO
allocations may be the result of an efficient capital-raising
process. Individual investors have a relatively small role
because they are less important to the process than
institutional investors. Institutions are more attractive buyers
because they are willing and able to buy large blocks of shares,
reducing marketing costs and spreading underwriter risk.
Institutions are also far more likely than individuals to
be repeat players in the IPO market." Because both the
underwriter and the institution know that they will need each
other in the future, they are more likely to accommodate one
another in the present. If, for example, the underwriter needs
to sell a cold offering - one expected to spark little aftermarket
demand - the underwriter may be able to call on its
institutional clients to take an allocation, implicitly promising
them shares of hot IPOs in the future. By enabling
underwriters to spread the risk of sticky issues, this
relationship should render them less reluctant to bring risky
issues to market, thereby reducing the cost of capital to issuers.
Furthermore, as noted above, allocations to institutions reduce
marketing costs, reduce the underwriter's risk, and solve the
problem of investors' strategic withholding of information."
In other words, it may be neither coincidence nor
conspiracy that over seventy percent of IPO shares are sold to
162 See supra note 15.
163 Institutions have a steady supply of money to invest. Moreover, fund
managers actively manage their investments in search of optimal returns,
underwriters can be confident that institutional investors will be willing at least to
consider each new investment opportunity. Individuals, by contrast, are more likely to
invest sporadically and cannot therefore be counted on as a ready source of capital.
Repeat play has important implications for the development of cooperation. See
generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 96 (1984) (describing the
strategy of tit-for-tat in a multi-round game); John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey
of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 142
tbl.2.9 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (summarizing the evolution of
cooperation in studies of multi-round games).
'64 See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the investor reward hypothesis).
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institutions." It may instead be the result of an efficient
capital-raising process. A regulatory response that mandated
an increased role for individuals over institutions would thus
threaten to reduce the efficiency of the capital-raising process
and thereby increase the cost of capital to issuers.
B. Corporate Opportunities
From the point of view of the issuer and its investors, a
second problem relating to spinning concerns the question of
who should benefit from a profitable IPO allocation. The profit
opportunity of an IPO allocation might, under certain
circumstances, be thought properly to belong to the
corporation, to be shared by all of its shareholders, rather than
to the individual managers who received the allocation from
the underwriter. This application of the corporate opportunity
doctrine to the practice of spinning, first articulated by
Professor Maynard, has recently been endorsed by the
Delaware Court of Chancery. 16
The fundamental principle underlying the corporate
opportunity doctrine is that a director or officer, in her role
either as a fiduciary or an agent of the firm, ought not to take
for herself a business prospect or profit opportunity that should
go to the corporation.' Of course, deciding what opportunities
should go to the corporation poses difficulties, and courts have
created an assortment of factor-based tests to answer the
165 See supra note 9. See also Phillip L. Zweig et al., Beware the IPO Market:
Individual Investors are at a Big Disadvantage, BUS. WK., Apr. 4, 1994, at 84
(reporting on studies finding that institutional investors receive the majority of
allocations of hot IPOs).
'6 Maynard, supra note 141.
167 See In re eBay Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 19988-NC, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 4, *11 (Del. Ch., Jan. 23, 2004) (refusing motion to dismiss plaintiffs derivative
claims relating to spinning and holding that "[p]laintiffs have stated a claim that
defendants usurped a corporate opportunity of eBay").
16 See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Corporate Opportunity and
Comparative Advantage, 84 IOWA L. REV. 211 (1998) (favoring approach granting
corporate opportunities to directors and officers early in a firm's development); Harvey
Gelb, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine - Recent Cases and the Elusive Goal of
Clarity, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 371 (1997) (attempting to place recent cases within the
existing doctrinal paradigm); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities To Gold: A
Strategic Analysis Of The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE. L.J. 277 (1998)
(arguing that the corporate opportunities doctrine operates as a default mechanism for
allocating property rights between a corporation and those who manage it and that the
doctrine implements the terms of a contract that the parties would have reached
through Coasean bargaining).
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question, focusing on such items as the firm's line of business,1"9
the interests and expectancies of the corporation,7 ' and the
capacity in which the individual became aware of the
prospect.' The basic concerns motivating these tests can be
traced at least to the Meinhard v. Salmon opinion,'72 in which
Judge Cardozo remarked famously, perhaps infamously, that:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."'
In spite of the proliferation of standards, or perhaps because of
it,' 4 determining what constitutes a corporate opportunity is
'69 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
[Ihf there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity
which the corporation is financially able to undertake, is from its nature, in
the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one
in which the corporation has an interest or reasonable expectancy, and, by
embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be
brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him
to seize the opportunity for himself. And, if, in such circumstances, the
interests of the corporation are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim
all of the benefits of the transaction for itself, and the law will impress a trust
in favor of the corporation upon the property, interests and profits so
acquired.
Id. at 511.
170 The prior interest or expectancy test asks whether the opportunity is
something that the corporation would have wanted (an interest) or whether it is
something that in the ordinary course of business would have come to the corporation
(an expectancy). See Gauger v. Hintz ,55 N.W.2d 426 (Wis. 1952).
[O]ne who occupies a fiduciary relationship to a corporation may not acquire,
in opposition to the corporation, property in which the corporation has an
interest or tangible expectancy or which is essential to its existence. This
corporate right or expectancy ... may arise from various circumstances; such
as, for example, the fact that directors had undertaken to negotiate in the
field on behalf of the corporation, or that the corporation was in need of the
particular business opportunity to the knowledge of the directors, or that the
business opportunity was seized and developed at the expense, and with the
facilities of the corporation.
Id. at 435-36.
' See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (noting that, in addition to other considerations, if
'a business opportunity comes to a corporate officer or director in his individual
capacity rather than in his official capacity ... the officer or director is entitled to treat
the opportunity as his own").
172 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). The issues in Meinhard arose in the
context of a joint venture, but the basic principle - that a co-venturer may not take for
himself an opportunity that ought to go to the enterprise - can be seen to motivate the
corporate opportunity doctrine.
173 249 N.Y. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
174 Each of the various factors for determining a corporate opportunity has
been critiqued. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at
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not much easier, or much more principled, than engaging in
punctilio analytics.15
Professor Maynard's application of the corporate
opportunity doctrine to the practice of spinning traces the
example of Robertson Stephens' allocation of Pixar IPO shares
to Joseph Cayre, the CEO of GT Interactive Software, a firm
then planning its own public offering. "' Professor Maynard
focuses on the capacity factor, emphasizing that since Cayre's
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARv. L. REV. 997, 1012 (1981) ("The case law conception
of 'line of business,' which is analogous to functional relationship, is ephemeral, beingsometimes as broad as the corporate charter and other times limited by the firm's
actual operations."); id. at 1014-16 (noting that "the cases have reached contradictory
conclusions regarding the existence of an interest in contexts that are not relevantlydistinguishable" and concluding that "the concept is of little help in deciding particular
cases or predicting the outcomes of the next ones") (footnotes omitted). Brudney andClark further criticize the line of business test on the basis of economic theory,
according to which "the modern publicly held corporation should accept anyopportunity that it expects will produce a risk-adjusted rate of return at least matchingthat of its current operations," leaving the corporation's "line of business" potentially
open to any opportunity regardless of its type and relationship to the firm's current
operations. Id. at 1025 (footnote omitted). As a result of this individual indeterminacy,
courts occasionally mix factors and pick and choose among the various available tests.See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander of New York, Inc. v. Fritzen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 530, 534-35,147 A.D.2d 241, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1989) (reciting the various tests and
noting that "none of these tests alone is consistently sufficient to answer the question
of what constitutes a 'corporate opportunity'. While the cases in this jurisdiction havegenerally announced reliance on the 'interest or tangible expectancy' test, in someinstances consideration has been given to the other tests. Some cases refer to all
relevant factors.") (citations omitted). See also Pat IK Chew, Competing Interests In TheCorporate Opportunity Doctrine, 67 N.C. L. REV. 435, 466-67 (1989) ("[Vlariousjurisdictions appear to have incongruent and unpredictable approaches to corporate
opportunity disputes. Even within the same jurisdictions, the courts sometimes citedifferent tests. Even when the courts cite the same test, they interpret them
differently.") (footnotes omitted).
175 Delaware recently revisited its approach to corporate opportunities in Brozv. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). There, the court
emphasized the following factors:[whether] (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2)
the opportunity is within the corporation's line of business; (3) the
corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) bytaking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby beplaced in a position inimicable [sic] to his duties to the corporation.Id. at 155. The Court in Broz also noted that notwithstanding the existence of acorporate opportunity, the director or officer could nevertheless seize the prospect for
herself if:(1) the opportunity is presented to the director or officer in his individual and
not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is not essential to the
corporation; (3) the corporation holds no interest or expectancy in the
opportunity; and (4) the director or officer has not wrongfully employed the
resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity.
Id.
176 See Maynard, supra note 141. This is the same example that the WallStreet Journal used in breaking the story in its 1997 expos6 of spinning. See supra note
10.
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receipt of spinning allocations was a direct result of his position
within GT Interactive, his fiduciary duties required him to
offer the opportunity to the corporation.'77 On the basis of this
analysis, Professor Maynard ultimately concludes that there is
"no doubt that the common law, including Delaware, would
find that this investment opportunity constituted a corporate
opportunity."'78
Given the vagaries of factor-based analyses, however,
this conclusion is far from certain. Indeed, other factors of
corporate opportunity analysis are more ambiguous in their
treatment of the practice, and some weigh against the finding
of a corporate opportunity. Because "[n]o one factor is
dispositive and all factors must be taken into account insofar as
they are applicable,"79 these considerations may prevent courts
from finding a usurpation of corporate opportunity in the
practice of spinning. First, although the corporation might be
able to afford to undertake the investment opportunity, an
operating company, such as GT Interactive, is probably not in
the line of business of investing in the IPO market. Similarly,
because operating companies, unlike holding companies and
investment funds," ordinarily earn returns through their
117 See Maynard, supra note 141, at 2080-81.
Because the opportunity came to Mr. Cayre only because of his position
within the corporation and in apparent anticipation that he would direct the
corporation's investment banking business to Robertson Stephens, it would
seem the corporation's interest predominates the individual interests of the
corporation's CEO, Mr. Cayre. Accordingly, if this allocation was made in
order to obtain the company's future business, it would seem that this
investment opportunity should be shared with all shareholders of GT
Interactive.
Id. (emphasis in original).
178 Maynard, supra note 141, at 2081.
"9 Broz, 673 A.2d at 155.
'80 Unlike operating companies, investment companies and other entities
primarily engaged in investment easily meet the line of business and
interest/expectation prongs of corporate opportunities analysis for their spinning gains.
Moreover, several such companies appear to have participated in spinning during the
late 1990s. See Smith et al., supra note 145 ("Recent disclosures . . . about the
allocation of hot IPOs generally have focused on chief executives or their chief financial
officers . . . . But also receiving generous allotments of IPO shares were venture
capitalists, whose firms invest in early stage companies and who often help determine
which investment banks fledgling companies select when they decide to go public
themselves."). In addition to the usurpation of a corporate opportunity, fund managers
who take spinning allocations for themselves rather than for their fund also violate the
NASD's Free-Riding and Withholding Rules. See National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule IM-2110-1(b)(4) (2003) (barring the
allocation of hot issues to officers who may determine the investment decisions of any
"institutional type account," including "a bank, savings and loan institution, insurance
company, investment company, [and) investment advisory firm"). See also supra notes
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operations rather than their investments, it is difficult to argue
that the corporation has an interest in or expectation of
receiving the spinning allocation. Considering all of the factors
relevant to a corporate opportunity analysis, at least in
Delaware, introduces considerable doubt into whether spinning
would be treated as a corporate opportunity that could not be
taken by the manager. '
The lack of clarity surrounding the corporate
opportunity doctrine, however, should not obscure spinning as
a potential fiduciary duty problem. Corporate opportunity
analysis is not a separate doctrine, but rather a subcategory of
duty of loyalty analysis.' If corporate opportunity analysis is
not particularly apt, general duty of loyalty principles may still
apply to the practice.
C. Corruption and Conflict of Interest
This Article has sought to emphasize that the practice of
spinning is inextricably intertwined with the underpricing of
IPOs." Spinning from an underwriter to an issuer's managers
may amount to a quid pro quo arrangement, according to which
the managers accept the benefit of the allocation in exchange
for the underpricing of their company's offering."M Because it
effectively enriches the issuer's managers at the expense of the
company they manage, this tacit arrangement may violate the
managers' duty of loyalty to the issuer.
36-39 and accompanying text (discussing Free-Riding and Withholding Rules in
connection with spinning).
18' Delaware's permissive approach to corporate opportunities bears special
emphasis in light of the recent amendment of the General Corporation Law to permit
corporations to opt-out of the corporate opportunities doctrine through a charter
provision. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(17) (2003). Added in 2000, this provision
adds to the enumerated power of Delaware corporations the power to:
[rienounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of
directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered
an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified
classes or categories of business opportunities that are presented to the
corporation or 1 or more of its officers, directors or stockholders.
Id. Other states, especially those adopting the ALI approach, may still follow a
restrictive approach to corporate opportunities. The ALI test for corporate
opportunities is written in the disjunctive, so the failure of spinning allocations to meet
the capacity standard - for the reasons advanced by Professor Maynard - would be an
adequate basis to find a corporate opportunity in a state following the ALI model. See
ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance, § 5.05(b).
182 See Gelb, supra note 168.
1"3 See supra Parts II and III.
1 See supra Part III.C.
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As a general matter, analyses under the duty of loyalty
are triggered by the appearance of a conflict of interest between
a corporation and its managers." Such conflicts arise when
managers stand on both sides of a transaction, acting on one
side of the deal in their individual capacity as the seller or
lender, and representing the corporation on the other as buyer
or borrower." Slightly more subtle conflicts may arise when
managers take an interest, such as a commission, in the
completion of a particular transaction with a particular party.'87
A conflict of interest alone does not imply a breach of the duty
of loyalty, as is emphasized in the Model Business Corporations
Act:
[I]t is important to keep firmly in mind that it is a contingent risk we
are dealing with - that an interest conflict is not in itself a crime or a
tort or necessarily injurious to others. Contrary to much popular
usage, having a 'conflict of interest" is not something one is "guilty
of"; it is simply a state of affairs."
185 See generally Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate
Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1997).
The obligation of loyalty is to serve the interests of the beneficiary rather
than those of the fiduciary. In its most demanding form, it requires the
fiduciary to serve solely the beneficiary's interests and to refrain from any
kind of behavior (in performing services or in dealing with the beneficiary or
the property in its control) from which the fiduciary may gain in excess of
specified compensation - even if such behavior imposes no cost on the
beneficiaries or, indeed, if the failure to engage in such behavior causes a loss
to them.
Id. at 599 n.9. In addition to the duty of loyalty analysis focusing on corporate
fiduciaries developed in this section, general agency principles may apply to spinning
allocations received by corporate officers. Agents owe their principals a duty of loyalty,
which generally forbids agents from receiving other compensation in connection with
the agency relationship unless the principal consents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 388 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit in
connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is under a
duty to give such profit to the principal."). Spinning allocations to corporate officers
represent additional compensation coming to the agent by reason of her agency, thus
violating basic principles of agency law.
186 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.60 (1999).
187 For example, a director or officer may have a financial stake in the
transaction through an ownership interest in the counterparty or a commision-based
interest in the transaction itself. Alternately, the officer or director may have a seat on
the board of the counterparty. In such cases, the conflict of interest is less direct, but
nevertheless gives rise to a set of competing duties and interests on the part of the
manager. Most state statutes respond to both kinds of conflict. See, e.g.,DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2003) (covering transactions between the corporation and an
officer or director as well as transactions in which directors and officers have
management positions with the counterparty or "have a financial interest"); CAL CORP.
CODE § 3109(a)-(b) (2003) (same).
188 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANNOTATED § 8.60, subch. F, introductory cmt.
(1998).
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A conflict of interest, however, does trigger heightened scrutiny
under the duty of loyalty, resulting in an insistence on the
objective fairness of the transaction.'" To apply this rubric to
the practice of spinning, the threshold question thus is whether
the acceptance of a spinning allocation creates a conflict of
interest between the issuer and its managers.
If spinning does create a conflict of interest between the
issuer and its managers, it is not immediately apparent. After
all, the shares given to the issuer's managers are shares from
other offerings. That those offerings are underpriced would
seem to have no bearing on the issuer. The issuer's managers
got a good deal, but that does not necessarily imply that the
issuer got a bad one. The bad deal, if indeed there is one, seems
to be suffered by those other issuers whose shares were
underpriced and spun to the managers of this issuer. But such
an account ignores the implicit bargaining between the
underwriter and the issuer's managers and the mechanisms of
the offering process as a whole.
Although the source of value to managers lies in the
underpriced shares of another corporation, the intended effect
of this payment is to induce management to accede to the
underpricing of its own public offering." Because they can
anticipate resistance in their attempt to underprice the
offering, underwriters offer spinning allocations to induce the
issuer's managers to concede on price. The wealth transfer is
thus from the issuer (in the form of foregone offering proceeds)
to the underwriter (in the form of underpriced shares that both
reduce underwriting risk and permit future spinning
allocations to other parties) then partially back to the issuer's
managers (in the form of spinning allocations from other
offerings).'91 In light of this process, spinning begins to appear
as a non-pro-rata wealth transfer - that is, classic self-
dealing."2
19 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When
directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required
to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of
the bargain.").
19 See supra Part III.C.
'9' The spinning allocation received by the issuer's managers only partially
reflects the capital foregone by the issuer through underpricing since a substantial
portion of the issuer's aggregate underpricing will be used to generate other spinning
and underpricing opportunities for the underwriter.
1 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (1971) (defining self-
dealing as the receipt of a benefit "to the exclusion of, and detriment to, [the]
stockholders").
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Transactions involving a conflict of interest between
managers and their corporations may survive judicial scrutiny,
even without approval or ratification, if the conflicted manager
can show that the transaction is "fair" to the corporation and
its shareholders.1 3 A fair transaction is one that approximates
the agreement that unrelated parties would have reached had
they bargained at arms length. 9 4 The fairness test, sometimes
stated as "entire fairness" or "intrinsic fairness," thus requires
the court to step back and imagine a hypothetical bargain
between non-conflicted parties. In the context of spinning, it
requires the decision maker to imagine whether the
shareholders of the issuer - the real counterparty in the
spinning quid pro quo - would agree to the underpricing of the
offering and the concomitant allocation of spun shares to
management.
Such an agreement is hard to imagine. Although the
explanations of underpricing in Part III.A suggested that
underpricing could, in some circumstances, benefit the issuer,19
the only explanation to connect underpricing to spinning rests
fundamentally on the problem of agency costs,"9 which by
definition cannot benefit the corporation or its shareholders. In
other words, it may be that underpricing, in limited amounts
and in limited circumstances, is beneficial to the issuer, but it
193 See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Because the directors of SLE were also officers, directors and/or shareholders of LGT,
the burden was on the defendant directors to demonstrate that the transactions
between SLE and LGT were fair and reasonable."). See also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (discussing the fairness standard at length). In addition to
allocating the burden of proof to managers in the first instance, courts tend to resolve
doubts in the favor of the corporation or its shareholders and against conflicted
management. See, e.g., Charles Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in
Corporate Law: An Essay on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1991)
(explaining tendency of courts to resolve doubts against directors in conflict of interest
context by reference to "fuzzy set" theory).
194 See, e.g., Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 225 (Del. 1976) (concluding
that an interested director transaction nevertheless passed the test of intrinsic fairness
because "this transaction was one which at that time would have commended itself to
an independent corporation in [the same] position").
195 The signaling explanation, for example, suggests that underpricing may
benefit the issuer by signaling to other market participants that the issuer is a high
value firm. See supra Part III.A.1. The lawsuit avoidance explanation argues that
underpricing benefits the issuer by reducing the likelihood and cost of securities
lawsuits. See supra Part III.A.2. The adverse selection hypothesis claims that
underpricing benefits issuers by keeping uninformed investors in the market as
potential investors in their offerings. See supra Part III.A.3. Finally, the investor
reward hypothesis argues that underpricing benefits issuers by providing an incentive
for investors to reveal the true level of demand. See supra Part III.A.4.
'96 See supra Part III.C.
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does not follow that the outsized underpricing observed in the
late 1990s and resulting from the tacit quid pro quo between
underwriters and managers benefited the corporation in any
way. Moreover, the suggestion that shareholders might agree
to some level of underpricing in the offering does not imply that
they would allow their managers to receive spinning allocations
in connection with the offering. Indeed, why would any
shareholder of the issuer allow a private arrangement between
its managers and its underwriter that reduced the amount of
capital raised in the offering?'97
Two lines of decisions - one involving secret
commissions and compensation arrangements, and the other
involving self-interested allocations of costs and benefits - may
provide useful analogies to guide the analysis of spinning as a
possible breach of the duty of loyalty.
Undisclosed compensation arrangements and secret
commissions have been held to create conflicts violating a
fiduciary's duty of loyalty. In Tarnowski v. Restop,"9 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that secret commissions paid
to a buyer's agent upon consummation of a transaction can
amount to a conflict of interest in violation of the agent's duty
of loyalty, and condemned the arrangement as "nothing more
or less than the acceptance by the agent of a bribe to perform
his duties in the manner desired by the person who gave the
bribe."" Similarly, Delaware courts have held that a target
director's finder's fee in connection with a merger transaction
can amount to a conflict of interest.2" A manager's receipt of a
197 One response to this question is that spinning is a kind of implicit
compensation for managers. However, shareholders presumably favor transparent
compensation arrangements as a policy matter so that they know exactly how much
they are paying their managers. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, Item 402, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2002) (making preference for transparency
regarding executive compensation into a securities law obligation). Insofar as spinning
represents implicit compensation for participating managers, it is a form of hidden
compensation contrary to shareholder preferences and in breach of the manager's duty
of loyalty according to the line of cases cited at infra notes 198-202 and discussed in the
accompanying text.
198 51 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1952).
' Id. at 803 (quoting Lum v.Clark, 57 N.W. 662, 663 (Minn. 1894)).
• See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994),
affd, Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (finding, on
remand, that the conflict of interest presented by the director's finder's fee was not
sufficiently large to support the finding of materiality necessary to conclude that the
director had breached the duty of loyalty). Much of the reasoning in the Technicolor
case can be limited to the context of a merger transaction. Mergers involve large scale
changes in the business of a corporation, often resulting in a reshuffling of
management. If the court had shown itself to be too liberal in finding material conflicts
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spinning allocation is like an agent's receipt of a secret
commission because it gives the manager an incentive to favor
the counterparty over her principal - in this case, to favor the
underwriter in a pricing negotiation over the issuer. This
conflict of interest, given the magnitude of foregone offering
proceeds and the value of the spinning allocation to the
recipient,20 ' ought easily to be found sufficiently material to
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.202 It resembles, as
some commentators have noted, "commercial bribery.""
Spinning also evokes a line of cases finding a breach of
the duty of loyalty when managers allocate the risk or cost of a
transaction to their corporation but keep the benefits for
themselves. In Enstar Group, Inc. v. Grassgreen,' defendants
who were corporate managers as well as partners in a private
investment fund were held to have breached their duty of
loyalty to the corporation in connection with a scheme that
allocated costs, in the form of investment obligations, to the
corporation, but allocated benefits, in the form of "commitment
fees," to their partnership and, through it, to themselves.2 "' In
condemning this arrangement, the court stated:
of interest, thus forcing directors to defend their transactions under the standard of
entire fairness, it would have severely restricted business judgment deference, the
standard generally applied in the context of negotiated acquisitions, and risked
establishing Delaware courts as "super directors." See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41 n.13 (Del. Ch.
Jan.31, 1989) (Chancellor Allen) ("To recognize in courts a residual power to review the
substance of business decisions for 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' or 'rationality' where
those decisions are made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with
appropriate care is to make of courts super-directors."); accord Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (explaining that limiting the business judgment rule "invite[s]
courts to become super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business
decisionmaking").
201 See supra note 18 (providing measurements of percentage underpricing
and aggregate dollars "left on the table") and note 141 (addressing the materiality of
spinning allocations in the hands of the recipient).
202 See Technicolor, 663 A.2d at 1151 ('Material' in this setting refers to a
financial interest that in the circumstances created a reasonable probability that the
independence of the judgment of a reasonable person in such circumstances could be
affected to the detriment of the shareholders generally.").
2w See Mark D. Seltzer, Spinning Hot Stocks: Is It a Crime?, BuS. CRIMES
BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG., Sept. 1998, at 7, 8 (1998) (discussing the viability of
spinning prosecutions under state commercial bribery and other criminal statutes and
concluding that proof problems would overwhelm most prosecutions). See also John C.
Coffee, Jr., "Spinning" for Dollars: IPO's and Allocation of Hot Issues, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
26, 1998, at 5 (stating that spinning "practices are fraught with obvious conflicts of
interest - and in extreme cases could even amount to commercial bribery").
204 812 F. Supp. 1562 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
205 See id. Interestingly, the commitment fees paid in Enstar arose in
connection with Michael Milken's junk bond financings. Under this arrangement,
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Investing corporate funds in junk bonds with high interest rates
certainly may be a legitimate act by an investment manager. It is
the manager's duty however, to see that his corporation receives the
full benefit of the transaction, and this would include fees paid for
making a commitment to invest the corporate funds. The president
of a corporation has no more right to personally receive hundreds of
thousands of dollars for commitments to invest millions of his
corporation's dollars than the company's purchasing agent has to
take kickbacks from a firm from whom he buys supplies. The
principle is the same: the person's duty to the corporation must be
exercised without thought of personal gain. 6
There is a close analogy between these commitment fees and
an allocation of spun shares in the context of an IPO. Each
involves an allocation of cost to the corporate entity - as risk
or, in the context of spinning, foregone capital - and an
allocation of benefits to the managers themselves in the form of
a commitment fee or spun shares. This allocation of costs and
benefits plainly enriches the manager at the expense of her
shareholders and, unless approved or ratified,"'7 will likely
amount to a duty of loyalty violation.208
Each of these cases can be used to argue that spinning
amounts to a breach of the duty of loyalty. When managers
accept spinning allocations, they exploit the corporation they
manage and impose agency costs on their shareholders by
conceding to a suboptimally priced offering. In return, the
managers receive the benefit of underpriced shares. This
investors agreed to purchase junk bonds in exchange for a commitment fee. Whether
the investors were ultimately obliged to purchase the junk bonds depended upon
whether the activity subject to the financing, usually a hostile takeover attempt,
succeeded. If the takeover went forward, the investors were required to purchase an
allocation of bonds. However, the commitment fee was paid to the investors regardless
of whether the financing went forward.
206 Id. at 1571.
207 Those conflict transactions that do not meet the exacting standard of entire
fairness may nevertheless be upheld if approved by disinterested directors or ratified
by shareholders. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 310 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 144(a)
(2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713(a)-(d) (Consol. 2003); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§
8.60-63 (1999). See also Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary
Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 956 (1993) ("Although the provisions vary
widely, most state statutes are worded so that a contract with a director will not be
voidable if it is approved by either disinterested directors or shareholders, or if it is fair
to the corporation at the time it is made.").
'0" See also O'Malley v. Boris, Civ. A. No. 15735-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 33
(Del. Chancery, March 18, 2002) (finding that a brokerage firm breached its duty of
loyalty in connection with a quid pro quo arrangement where the firm deposited client
accounts with a particular bank in exchange for the bank giving the firm a free equity
interest in a joint venture between the two).
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presents a material conflict of interest similar to commission
arrangements consistently found to violate the duty of loyalty.
D. Which Investors?
As discussed in the preceding sections, the harm of
spinning is neither that it unfairly disadvantages individual
investors in the allocation process nor that it enables managers
to usurp corporate opportunities. Rather, through its
connection to underpricing, spinning results in the failure of
the issuer to maximize its capital-raising efforts, thus
undermining the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization.2 9 Worse, as a manifestation of the agency cost
problem and a probable breach of the duty of loyalty, spinning
essentially enables managers to appropriate shareholder
wealth for themselves. This plainly harms the issuer's
shareholders. But, the question remains, which shareholders?
Of all of the shareholders of the issuer, which have been
harmed by spinning? And which shareholders should therefore
have standing to assert claims against the corporation or its
managers?
Investors may have become shareholders of the issuer
either (1) after the IPO, by purchasing shares in the
aftermarket, (2) in the IPO, by buying shares from the
underwriter at the offering price, or (3) before the IPO, by
investing in the issuer prior to the public offering. Each of
these categories of shareholders is situated differently with
respect to the harm of spinning.
1. Investors Acquiring the Issuer's Shares Through the
Secondary Market
Investors who acquired shares of the issuer after the
IPO - that is, by purchasing shares in the secondary market -
probably suffer no harm from spinning. This Article has argued
that the harm of spinning lies in its connection to the
209 This article follows the standard approach in corporate law scholarship in
treating shareholder wealth maximization as the fundamental purpose of corporate
law. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense Of The Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply To Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993)
("Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides
U.S. corporate decisionmakers."). Most of its conclusions regarding the destructiveness
of spinning, however, should comport with any corporate law theory, except perhaps
one that stresses CEO welfare maximization.
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underpricing of the issuer's shares in the offering. Once those
shares arrive on the secondary market, however, their price no
longer bears any relation to the offering price or perhaps, as
some have suggested, any relation to reality.21 It is therefore
difficult to argue that any harm suffered by the issuer (by
failing to price its shares at aftermarket demand) was also
suffered by those who purchased shares in the secondary
market (at prices determined by aftermarket demand).
Furthermore, by the time secondary market buyers purchased
shares of the issuer, full information regarding the offering
price and aggregate proceeds of the IPO would have been
disclosed to the market through the issuer's prospectus. 11 As a
result, such buyers made their decisions with full knowledge of
the amount of capital raised by the issuer and arguably
accepted the underpricing of the IPO by buying
notwithstanding the issuer's suboptimal capital raising. Simply
stated, the underpricing of the issuer's shares in the offering
either does not affect secondary market purchasers at all
(because they did not buy shares in the offering) or it bears
their implicit assent (because they purchased the issuer's
shares with full knowledge of exactly how much capital was
raised in the offering).2
210 Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet Bust, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 54 (2001) (with respect to the market for internet
IPOs).
211 See Securities Act Rule 434, 17 C.F.R. 230.434 (2002) (stating the
mechanisms for final prospectus delivery and noting that a prospectus may be
completed by the addition of a term sheet including price information).
212 There is an argument that secondary market purchasers are harmed by
spinning because it builds enthusiasm for the issuer's shares in the aftermarket by
taking advantage of noise trading. See supra note 59 (discussing the availability
heuristic and cascades); see generally Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986)
(discussing implications of noise trading in capital markets); J. Bradford de Long et al.,
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990) (same). A
shareholder who bought shares in such a market might claim that she was harmed by
spinning because it created the necessary conditions for underpricing in the initial
issuance, which were then exploited to over-inflate the price of secondary market
shares. This argument, however, is a bit of a stretch. Just as signaling is an unlikely
explanation for underpricing because it is too easy to imitate, underpricing probably
cannot be reliably used to influence the price of shares on the secondary market. If
markets are truly noisy, the issuer cannot be confident that the false signal of
underpricing will be successfully received. And if arbitrageurs and other market
professionals are aware that underpricing is being relied upon as a false signal for
value, they will act to correct any subsequent mispricings. See Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 58. See also supra Part III.A.1.
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2. Investors Acquiring the Issuer's Shares in the
Offering
If spinning does not seem to have harmed shareholders
who purchased their shares in the secondary market following
an IPO, it is even less likely to have harmed shareholders who
purchased their shares at the offering price in the IPO. In fact,
because spinning promotes underpricing, which by definition
allows buyers in the offering to pay less for their shares, it
arguably benefits those who bought their shares in the IPO. If
unencumbered by anti-flipping restrictions, these shareholders
may be able to get an immediate return on their investment by
selling in the aftermarket. Moreover, even those who do not sell
in the immediate aftermarket will not have been harmed by
the issuer's failure to maximize capital raised in the offering
because, though it means they share in fewer total assets at
the corporate level, they paid less for the privilege. The pie may
be smaller, in other words, but a proportionally equal slice
costs less. Furthermore, information on the price and proceeds
raised in the offering will have been fully disclosed in the
issuer's prospectus before the commitment to buy became
binding. If the buyer is unhappy with the amount of capital
raised in the offering, she can elect not to go through with her
purchase. But instead, IPOs at the offering price tend to be
viewed as prized investments, and most buyers are likely to
want a larger allocation, especially if the shares are
underpriced.
3. Investors Acquiring the Issuer's Shares Prior to the
Offering
Although it does not seem to harm shareholders who
acquired their equity interest in the issuer either during or
after the IPO, underpricing is demonstrably harmful to those
shareholders who had an ownership interest in the issuer prior
to the IPO. Moreover, they suffer regardless of whether the
issuer responds to underpricing by reducing the proceeds
raised in the offering and holding constant the number of
shares sold (the "float") or by increasing the float and
maintaining the same aggregate offering proceeds. In the first
case, the dilution of the shareholder's percentage stake does
not increase but it is worth less, and in the second case, the
shareholder's stake is diluted. In either case, the value of the
shareholder's investment decreases.
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The pre-IPO shareholder's loss can be illustrated with a
simple numerical example. Imagine an investor, Alice, who has
invested $100,000 for 10,000 shares of a start-up firm,
Wonderland.com. After a few years of operations,
Wonderland.com has accumulated $10,000,000 in assets and is
poised to expand. At this time, Alice's 10,000-share stake
represents one percent of the company. Wonderland.com would
like to double in size through the offering, raising another
$10,000,000, again at ten dollars per share, to grow to a total of
$20,000,000 in assets. The first thing to note is that without
underpricing and subject to the customary simplifying
assumption of no transaction costs, Alice's wealth will not be
affected although her stake will be diluted. Her 10,000 shares
will represent a 0.5 percent rather than a one percent stake in
the company, but 0.5 percent of a company with $20,000,000 in
assets is worth $100,000, the same amount that her one
percent stake had been worth before the offering.
Alice's wealth changes, however, as soon as
underpricing is introduced. And it changes for the worse. If,
instead of pricing the shares at ten dollars each,
Wonderland.com agrees with its bankers that the issue should
be sold for nine dollars per share, Wonderland.com faces a
choice. It can either (1) raise the $10,000,000 as planned by
selling more shares, or (2) reduce the amount of proceeds it will
raise but keep the float constant, at 1,000,000 shares. If
Wonderland.com chooses to keep the float constant but reduce
the offering proceeds, it will sell 1,000,000 shares at nine
dollars each and raise $9,000,000. This will not further dilute
Alice, but it will reduce the value of her investment. She will
have, as she expected, a 0.5 percent stake in Wonderland.com
after the IPO. But the total assets of Wonderland.com will be
only $19,000,000, and Alice's stake will be worth only $95,000,
rather than $100,000.
If, instead of selling the same number of shares but
raising less in the offering, Wonderland.com decides to hold to
its target for aggregate proceeds by selling more shares, as a
result of pricing the offering at nine dollars instead of ten
dollars, it must sell an additional 111,111 shares to raise
$10,000,000. In this case, Alice's ownership stake will be
diluted and her wealth will be reduced. Her 10,000 shares will
represent only 0.47 percent of the total (2,111,111) shares of
Wonderland.com. As planned, the company will still have
$20,000,000 in assets at the conclusion of the offering, but the
value of Alice's stake will be worth less, down to approximately
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$94,737 from $100,000. Either way, the underpricing of the
Wonderland.com offering plainly leaves Alice worse off.
Spinning, because it is a cause of and contributing
factor to underpricing, is integrally involved in decreasing the
wealth of pre-IPO shareholders. Interestingly, although
managers frequently lament the fees paid in IPOs and
occasionally acknowledge underpricing as a problem, they
appear largely unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the
harms suffered by pre-IPO owners." '
V. RIGHTING THE WRONGS
A. Shareholder Litigation
Because Alice and those like her - that is, those
investors who were shareholders of the issuer prior to the IPO
- can show that they have been harmed by spinning, they
should have standing to assert a claim against the corporation
or its managers.2 "4 What, then, should be their remedy? Before
undertaking to answer this question, however, it is worth
noting that not every pre-IPO investor is like Alice. Many pre-
IPO investors are sophisticated venture capitalists who
presumably understand the dynamics of spinning and
underpricing. Moreover, venture capitalists themselves were
such common recipients of spinning allocations that a trade
group, the National Venture Capital Association, circulated a
memo to its members warning them that by engaging in
spinning, they risked stirring regulatory and prosecutorial
zeal.2" It therefore may be safe to assume that even if they did
not necessarily participate in spinning themselves, these
investors knew about it and condoned it 2 6
213 See Ryan & DeGraw, 2002 Study, supra note 71, tbl.5b & tbl.7 (showing
that in spite of their concern for the cost of the offering, well under 50% of CFOs agree
with the statement that substantial appreciation in share price on the first day of
trading represents losses for original owners or original shareholders).
214 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 327 (2003) (requiring for standing in
a derivative suit that the plaintiff was a stockholder of the corporation at the time the
harm that is the subject of the complaint occurred).
... Michael Siconolfi, IPO Market: Surviving the Storm - Venture Capitalists
Get a Stern Warning on "Spinning" IPOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at C16 (quoting a
group member's characterization of the message: "Times are good. Let's all not get
greedy, and remember an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.").
216 Professor Coffee has suggested that sophisticated market participants had
a relationship to spinning like the relationship of the authorities to gambling at Rick's
Cafd Am6ricain in the film Casablanca, in which Claude Rains, as Inspector Renault,
remarked "I'm shocked, shocked to learn that gambling is going on here," as he
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Of course, not every pre-IPO investor is a sophisticated
venture capitalist, and not every venture capitalist knows
about or approves of spinning. But note how small the universe
of harmed shareholders has become. It excludes those who
bought in the secondary market or in the offering itself. It
excludes the main source of pre-IPO financing, sophisticated
venture capital funds who knew about and understood
spinning. And it excludes the managers themselves, another
major contingent of pre-IPO shareholders who, because of their
unclean hands, are rightly excluded from the class of
shareholders damaged by the practice. The remaining
shareholders, after all of these groups have been excluded, is a
relatively small number of unsophisticated pre-IPO investors.
Nevertheless, like Alice, they appear to have been genuinely
harmed by the actions of their managers. What is their
remedy?
Alice and similarly situated pre-IPO investors have a
derivative claim against those issuers whose managers
engaged in spinning in connection with their IPO."' Because
Alice's financial loss from spinning is merely a proportional
share of the loss to the corporation, she may only pursue her
claim through the corporation"8 and seek to compel the
corporation to sue its disloyal managers, rather than filing a
direct claim against them."9 In order for the derivative claim to
go forward against the managers, the shareholder must first
demand that the corporation pursue it, leaving the decision of
whether to seek redress to the discretion of the board of
directors, the decision of which, for all practical purposes, is
pocketed his winnings for the evening. CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer 1942),
cited in John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Allocation Probe: Who is the Victim?, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 18, 2001, at 5.
"' A claim is derivative when the shareholder's loss is the result of a loss to
the corporation. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 528 (1984)
(quoting Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881) (an action is derivative if it is
"found on a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the
corporation itself is the appropriate plaintiff'). Suits alleging inadequacy of
consideration in the issuance of stock are derivative suits. See Bennett v. Breuil
Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 241 (Del. Ch. 1953).
218 See generally Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949) (a derivative action permits a shareholder to "step into the corporation's shoes
and to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand on his own").
2,9 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (a derivative action "is
the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue" as well as
"a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those
liable to it").
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final.2' The law's preference for corporate decision-makers over
injured shareholders in this context has occasionally been a
source of consternation among commentators,"' but recalls the
principle that absent a clear conflict of interest, directors are
given discretion to manage the corporation in the best interests
of its shareholders.222
It would not be surprising, under the facts as this
Article has presented them, if the issuer's board elected not to
pursue shareholders' claims relating to spinning. First,
assuming that the guilty managers do not eagerly volunteer
the several million dollars in offering proceeds foregone by the
issuer in connection with spinning and underpricing, the
corporation will be forced to pursue its managers in court. This
is a costly endeavor.223 In addition to destroying any working
relationship with what might otherwise be a perfectly
competent, even exceptional set of managers,224 the litigation
itself will be extraordinarily expensive, since managers are
likely to have adequate resources to mount a vigorous
defense.25 Moreover, full recovery, as measured by the marginal
220 Because the corporation's decision to sue, when made by a disinterested
majority of the board, is insulated by the business judgment rule, shareholders can
expect little success in challenging it. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
641 (1986) ("Whether to sue or not is ordinarily a matter for the business judgment of
directors, just as is a decision that the corporation will make bricks instead of
bottles.").
221 See generally Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment
Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355
(1993).
222 The underlying principle of the demand mechanism is that:
directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the
corporation .... The decision to bring a lawsuit or to refrain from litigating a
claim on behalf of a corporation is a decision concerning the management of
the corporation.
Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 772-73 (Del. 1990); see also Levine v. Smith, 591
A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) ("The directors of a corporation and not its shareholders
manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and accordingly, the directors are
responsible for deciding whether to engage in derivative litigation.") (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 265 (Del. 2000) (weighing the
costs of litigation against a convincing argument that the CEO's conduct constituted
gross negligence).
24 This loss of human capital must be factored into the costs of pursuing the
spinning claim. If the managers who engaged in spinning are no longer with the firm,
the cost to human capital will be less direct, but not necessarily less severe. A firm that
shows its willingness to pursue such claims against its former managers can expect to
have difficulty recruiting future managers in the labor market. See generally Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment
Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996) (describing how the norms of the labor
market structure the employment relationship).
225 As noted above, the legal analysis of spinning is based upon analogies to
secret commissions and other duty of loyalty cases. See supra Part IV.C. And the
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amount of underpricing in the offering, is unlikely for the
simple reason that many managers, even CEOs and CFOs of
public companies, may not have sufficient assets to reimburse
the firm for foregone offering proceeds.2"6 Once recovery is
discounted by the probability of success and the likelihood of
payment minus litigation costs, the pursuit of such claims may
no longer be a positive net present value undertaking.27
Disinterested directors arriving at this conclusion may thus
elect not to pursue these claims and may use the demand
mechanism to prevent shareholder claims from going forward.2u
As a result, although a derivative claim against
managers for breach of the duty of loyalty in connection with
theoretical basis of the claim - that managers' acceptance of spinning allocations was
part of an arrangement that harmed the issuer by leading to greater underpricing in
the offering - is difficult to prove empirically. See supra Part III.C.
226 The damage done to the corporation and its shareholders by spinning
might be measured by the aggregate amount of its underpricing (the harm to the
corporation) rather than the value of the managers' spinning allocation (the benefit to
the manager). Refinements to this formula might seek to exclude underpricing
stemming from the motives discussed in Part III that suggest a benefit to the issuer
from narrow (10-15%) underpricing. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Spinning appears to relate primarily to outsized underpricing, especially that observed
in the late 1990s. See Ritter & Welch, Review, supra note 118, 1810-11. As a result, it
might be more appropriate to measure the harm of spinning by the amount of any
excess underpricing - that is, underpricing greater than the cross-market average of
10-15%.
221 In addition, the dynamics of such litigation strongly favor settlement over
adjudication. If the issuer pursues a claim against its executives, the executives may
seek to settle while the claim is still covered under the firm's directors and officers
("D&O") insurance policy, as it generally would be, so long as the claim is settled
without admitting that the managers violated their duties of good faith and fair
dealing. See Michael Sean Quinn & Andrea D. Levin, Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance: Probable Directions in Texas Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 381, 403 (2001). Any
settlement paid out of the firm's D&O policy, however, ought to result in an increase in
the firm's insurance premiums and, in this way, ultimately be paid in large part by the
firm itself.
121 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor
in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1985); Reinier Kraakman et
al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L. J. 1733, 1736
(1994) (arguing that 'a derivative suit increases corporate value in two circumstances:
if the prospect of suit deters misconduct or, alternatively, if the suit itself yields a
positive recovery net of all costs that the corporation must bear as a consequence of
suit"); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (offering an empirical analysis of shareholder suits and finding
that shareholder suits neither offer meaningful monetary recoveries nor improve
corporate governance). At the conclusion of her empirical study, Romano emphasized
the following:
There are financial recoveries in only half of settled suits, and per share
recoveries are small .... The principal beneficiaries of the litigation ...
appear to be attorneys, who win fee awards in 90 percent of settled suits.
There is little evidence of specific deterrence .... There is scant evidence
that lawsuits function as an alternative governance mechanism of the board.
Id. at 84-85.
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spinning ought to be available, it would be unsurprising if the
remedy was rarely, if ever, pursued.
B. Regulatory Efforts
Even if, as the last section argued, derivative claims are
unlikely to be pursued and injured shareholders are unlikely to
be compensated, spinning nevertheless constitutes a serious
harm to the corporation, the capital-raising process, and
investor welfare. It ought to be stopped.
In recent months a number of regulatory initiatives
have targeted the practice of spinning. This section addresses
the regulatory approaches currently under consideration,
including the Voluntary Initiative resulting from the so-called
Global Settlement and the activities of SRO rule-making and
advisory bodies.
1. Voluntary Initiative Concerning Spinning
In April 2002, New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer filed an action under an old New York state law, the
Martin Act, 29 against several major investment banks in
connection with investment analyst conflicts of interest.3 9 The
SEC, NASD, NYSE, and a number of other state Attorneys
General later joined Spitzer in negotiating a settlement with
the investment banks, culminating in the so-called Global
Settlement, finalized a year later, in April 2003.31 In addition
229 The Martin Act broadly prohibits any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
by means of false pretense, representation or promise, and any concealment,
suppression, fraud, false pretense or false promise in connection with the sale of
securities or in connection with the offering of investment advice. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. L.
§ 352(1) (Consol. 2003).
230 See generally Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an
Order Pursuant to General Business Law 354, In re An Inquiry By Eliot Spitzer, at 3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2002) (Index No. 02-4015-22). This use of the Martin Act has been a
source of controversy among commentators. See generally Charles Gasparino, New
York Sues Telecom Executives Over Stock Profits: Attorney General Spitzer Seeks
Return of $1.5 Billion, Citing Salomon Dealings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2002, at Al
(quoting Professor Coffee to state that the enforcement action is "unprecedented" and
that there is "no logical connection" between Salomon Smith Barney analyst Jack
Grubman's rating on WordCom stock and Ebbers' IPO allotments, as asserted by the
Martin Act claim); Tamara Loomis, Attorney General Accuses Executives of 'Spinning'
Stock, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 2002, at 1 (quoting statement by David J. Kaufman, co-author
of McKinney's Commentary on the Martin Act, that the enforcement action is "brand
new, fascinating and compelling").
131 Joint Press Release, Securities Exchange Commission, New York Stock
Exchange, National Association of Securities Dealers, North American Securities
Administrators Association, and New York State Attorney General's Office, Ten of
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to the settlement of the conflict of interest investigation, each
party to the Global Settlement was encouraged to enter into a
"Voluntary Initiative Regarding Allocations of Securities in
'Hot' Initial Public Offerings to Corporate Executives and
Directors.""
Under the Voluntary Initiative, investment banks would
agree not to allocate hot IPO shares "to an account of an
executive officer or director of a U.S. public company" ' and
further agree not to "allocate securities in an IPO in exchange
for or for the purpose of obtaining investment banking
business." The Voluntary Initiative thus plainly targets
certain practices that fall under the rubric of spinning.. and
tailors a set of definitions to capture and forbid them.
However, in focusing on the spinning of IPO shares to
the executives of public companies," the Voluntary Initiative
misses the harm of spinning that is the central thrust of this
Article - that is, the harm to the issuer and its shareholders
when spinning allocations are doled out to pre-public
executives in exchange for concessions on offering price.
Executives receiving such allocations are, when the allocations
are made, managers of private companies. The allocations are
inducements to make concessions on offering price when the
company goes public. By the time the company has gone public
- that is, has made its IPO 7 - its managers will be barred from
receiving spinning allocations, but by then it is too late. The
allocation arrangement and concomitant quid pro quo would
have been entered into prior to the public offering - that is,
before the managers are excluded under the Voluntary
Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
232 See Press Release, Securities Exchange Commission, Voluntary Initiative
Regarding Allocations of Securities in 'Hot' Initial Public Offerings to Corporate
Executives and Directors [hereinafter Voluntary Initiative], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/globalvolinit.htm (last modified Mar. 28, 2003).
233 Id. at para. 1.
Id. at para. 3.
235 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing IPO allocations
to public company managers in exchange for investment banking business).
236 The Voluntary Initiative defines "public company" as "any company that is
registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or files periodic
reports pursuant to Section 15(d) thereof." See Voluntary Initiative, supra note 232, at
para. 1.
237 By making an IPO, the company will come under either § 12 or § 15(d) of
the Exchange Act and thus be captured by the Voluntary Initiative's definition of
.public company." See id.
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Initiative from receiving IPO allocations. As a result, the
Voluntary Initiative, as currently drafted, is unlikely to
constrain the harmful allocation practices identified in this
Article.
2. SRO Rule-Making
In addition to the Voluntary Initiative, the NYSE and
NASD have undertaken regulatory efforts designed to end the
practice of spinning.
In May 2003, an IPO Advisory Committee convened by
the NYSE and NASD issued a set of recommendations
designed to improve the integrity of the IPO process.2
Although the committee could not agree that IPOs in the late
1990s were deliberately underpriced to create spinning
opportunities,' a number of their recommendations are
designed to eliminate the ability of underwriters to enter into
quid pro quo arrangements in connection with IPO allocations.
The recommendations seek to arrive at this result by taking
away the structural features that enable the creation of such
arrangements, including inside management's control over the
pricing negotiation24  and the underwriter's information
asymmetries in the book-building process.2 ' Also along these
lines, the recommendations seek to end the unequal imposition
of anti-flipping restrictions - that is, the tendency of
underwriters to limit the ability of individuals, but not
institutions, to resell their shares"' - and to encourage the
development of Dutch auctions and other alternatives to the
m See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, May 2003 [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT], at
httpJ/www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/ipo-report.pdf.
239 See id. at 4 n.5.
24" The recommendations seek to require issuers to establish an IPO pricing
committee with at least one non-executive member. See id. at 4. Reading between the
lines, the insertion of outside directors into the pricing negotiations may be intended to
relieve some of the temptation of inside managers to accept spinning allocations in
exchange for concessions on offering price. The insertion of independent directors does
not wholly alleviate the problem, of course, since underwriters can simply offer
spinning allocations to the outsiders as well. However, the greater presence of others,
especially those bearing the imprimatur of "independent," may constrain the tendency
of managers to behave selfishly in pricing negotiations.
241 The recommendations would eliminate the underwriter's information
asymmetry in the book-building process by requiring underwriters to provide issuers
with all indications of interest before the pricing meeting, thus giving the issuer a
better sense of aggregate demand for the offering and increasing its ability to bargain
for a better offering price. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 7.
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book-building process."3 Finally, in addition to proposing
structural constraints on the ability of underwriters to profit
through IPO allocations, the Advisory Committee also suggests
an outright ban on the ability of underwriters to engage in
spinning, recommending that the SEC or the exchanges:
[pirohibit the allocation of IPO shares (1) to executive officers and
directors (and their immediate families) of companies that have an
investment banking relationship with the underwriter, or (2) as a
quid pro quo for investment banking business.244
The Advisory Committee supports a "clear prohibition on
spinning".. and cites changes in the NASD's rules regulating
IPO allocations as "a starting point.""4
The NASD regularly revises the rules governing the
IPO process."7 Proposed New Rule 2712, first introduced in
August 2002,48 and substantially revised in November of 2003
in response to the Advisory Committee's recommendations, 9
represents a significant effort to tighten the regulation of the
243 The recommendations seek to encourage alternatives to book-building
through the removal of regulatory constraints. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 238, at 9. Dutch Auctions foreclose the possibility of spinning by essentially
removing the underwriter from the offering process. In a Dutch Auction, each would-be
investor submits a bid for a certain amount of shares at a certain price. These bids are
then arranged in order of highest price to lowest, with the issuer accepting each offer to
buy until it has sold out the offering. The last offer to buy that the issuer accepts - i.e.,
the final order necessary to sell out the offering and, because it is farthest down the
list, the lowest offer - is the price paid by all bidders. See generally Note, Auctioning
New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 1381 (1985) (noting that the
mechanism solves the hold-out problem since low-ball bidders will not receive
allocations of an oversubscribed offering). By cutting out the underwriter's ability to
make allocations, the Dutch Auction method eliminates all harms associated with the
spinning of IPOs. However, it also cuts out the ability of underwriters to add value to
the IPO process by, for example, certifying issuer quality. See generally Booth & Smith,
Capital Raising, supra note 23. Moreover, Dutch Auctions may not address every
possible cause of underpricing. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 6 ("[If . . . IPO
underpricing results primarily from day trading excesses or systematic biases in the
market, Dutch Auctions may prove unsuccessful [solutions] ... ).
244 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 238, at 10.
'4' Id. at 10.
246 Id.
247 See generally supra note 39 (discussing a set of amendments to the Free-
Riding and Withholding Rules in the late 1990s).
28 See NASD Regulation, Inc., NASD Notice to Members (02-55), Regulation
of IPO Allocations and Distributions: NASD Requests Comment on Proposed New Rule
2712 (IPO Allocations and Distributions) and on an Amendment to Rule 2710
(Corporate Financing Rule) (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Notice].
249 See NASD Regulation, Inc., NASD Notice to Members (03-72), Proposed
Rule Governing Allocations and Distributions of Shares in Initial Public Offerings,
Request for Comment on Regulatory Approaches to Enhance IPO Pricing Transparency
(Nov. 2003) [hereinafter Proposed New Rule Amendment].
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offering process and restrict the practice of spinning. Proposed
New Rule 2712 targets spinning by prohibiting allocations of
IPO shares either on the condition of future investment
banking business or in consideration of past investment
banking business.2 " A number of the recent amendments to the
Proposed New Rule are direct outgrowths of the Advisory
Committee's report, including a requirement that information
gathered by the underwriter during the book-building process
be shared with the issuer,"' procedures implemented to prevent
reneged IPO allocations from being used to benefit specific
individuals,252 and rules imposing lock-up periods on issuer-
directed shares.2" The Proposed New Rule Amendment also
follows the Advisory Committee in emphasizing alternatives to
the traditional book-building process, requesting comment on
the use of an independent intermediary in the pricing process,
the development of an auction system, and the value of
increased disclosure in the prospectus regarding the pricing
decision.2
Although the Proposed New Rule is a significant effort
aimed at ending the practice of spinning, it complicates the
issue by regulating the practice on the basis of intent - that is,
whether the allocation is intended by the underwriter to induce
or reward investment banking business. " The underwriter's
defense - that the allocation was the result of an ordinary
250 NASD Proposed New Rule 2712(c) states:
No member or person associated with a member may allocate IPO shares to
an executive officer or director of a company: (1) on the condition that the
executive officer or director, on behalf of the company, direct future
investment banking business to the member, or (2) as consideration for
directing investment banking services previously rendered by the member to
the company.
Proposed Rule Notice, supra note 248, at Exhibit A.
211 NASD Proposed New Rule 2712(e)(1)(A), Proposed New Rule Amendment,
supra note 249, at 778. This corresponds to the Advisory Committee recommendation.
See discussion supra note 241 and accompanying text.
252 NASD Proposed New Rule 2712(e)(2), Proposed New Rule Amendment,
supra note 249, at 779.
253 NASD Proposed New Rule 2712(e)(1)(B), Proposed New Rule Amendment,
supra note 249, at 778. See also supra note 7 (discussing issuer-directed shares).
Interestingly, the Proposed New Rule does not require, as the Advisory Committee had
recommended, that anti-flipping restrictions be imposed equally on all individuals as
well as on institutions.
254 Proposed New Rule Amendment, supra note 249, at 776-77.
255 The NASD has emphasized that "[tihe provision is not intended to prohibit
a member from allocating IPO shares to a customer merely because the customer is an
executive officer or director of a company." Proposed Rule Notice, supra note 248, at
524-25.
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customer relationship rather than an attempt to curry favor
with the executive's company - is predictable and may be
expensive to defeat.25 Foreseeing these issues, the NASD has
also proposed amending existing Rule 2710 to require
underwriters to retain information regarding whether issuer-
managers have received any IPO allocations from the
underwriter during the six-month period preceding their
offering.57 Although this does not completely solve the problem
of proving intent, this information could be used, in comparison
with the underwriter's ordinary brokerage allocations, to argue
that the allocation to an issuer's manager was out of the
ordinary, perhaps supporting a presumption of an intent to
influence in violation of the Proposed New Rule.
It is worth pausing to consider whether additional rule
making is necessary at all given the NASD's existing
prohibitions against gratuities. NASD Rule 3060 prohibits
members from giving "anything of value, including gratuities,
in excess of one hundred dollars per individual per year" to
anyone "in relation to the business of the employer of the
recipient of the payment or gratuity."" This rule against
gratuities could be read to prohibit spinning allocations since
an opportunity to invest in a hot IPO would seem to qualify as
something "of value" and, according to the account of spinning
developed in this Article,' the corporate manager receives the
allocation as a result of his position within his firm."
See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth L. Josselyn, Chair of the Capital Markets
Committee of the Securities Industry Association, to Barbara Z. Sweeney, Office of the
Corporate Secretary of the NASD 3 (Sept. 24, 2002) (conveying comments of the
Securities Industry Association and noting that "the line between what is 'excessive' or
what has been done as or on 'a condition' or 'as consideration' for something can be
difficult to draw"), available at http://www.sia.com/2002_commentletters/pdf/ipo.pdf.
257 See Proposed Amendment to Rule 2710(b)(6)(vii), Proposed Rule Notice,
supra note 248, at Exhibit B.
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., NASD Manual Conduct
Rules, Rule 3060 (2003). Similarly, NYSE Rule 350(a) limits gratuities given by
members to "to principals, officers or employees of the Exchange or of other members or
member organizations or of securities, commodities or news and financial
organizations." Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to Rule 350, Compensation
or Gratuities to Employees of Others, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30877, 57 Fed. Reg.
30,283 (July 8, 1992) (approving increase on gratuities limitation from $50 to $100 per
year). The class of recipients barred from the receipt of gratuities under the NASD
Rule is broader than that under the NYSE, including anyone receiving a gift "in
relation to the business of [his] employer" while the NYSE Rule focuses primarily on
recipients in some relationship with the Exchange. As a result, the NASD Rule is more
likely to cover gratuities to corporate managers.
29 See supra Part II.B.
260 See, e.g., NASD Quattrone Complaint, supra note 145 (alleging that "the
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There are, however, at least two hurdles to the use of
NASD Rule 3060 to prevent spinning. First, although IPO
allocations are plainly something "of value," they may not fit
within the overall focus of the rule on gratuities for the simple
reason that the recipients of an IPO allocation must pay for
their shares. In arguing that IPO allocations are like
gratuities, the enforcer would need to focus attention on the
difference between the offering price and the aftermarket price
as the gratuity or "value" involved. Although there is some
precedent for this argument,2 "1 the counterargument is also
apparent - that is, that ex post share price appreciation is
uncertain ex ante and that purchasing shares in an IPO
involves precisely that risk and therefore ought not to be
treated as gratuity or plain "value." Second, Rule 3060, like
Proposed New Rule 2712, focuses on the intent of the donor,
creating proof problems and potentially costly litigation."' By
contrast, the Advisory Committee has suggested a more far-
reaching prohibition, asserting that "the very existence of an
investment banking relationship should bar all directors and
executive officers of the underwriter's investment banking
client from receiving any IPO shares from the underwriter."
Although none of the current rule-making proposals go
as far as the Advisory Committee's recommendations in
restricting the practice of spinning, they do seem to represent
steps in the right direction. They are, however, not without
costs. For example, under most current proposals, underwriters
may be forced to litigate intent after the fact and also bear the
additional burden of determining which individuals are eligible
to receive IPO allocations and which individuals, due to their
affiliation with the issuer or other investment banking clients,
are not.' In the case of amply oversubscribed issues, these
[CSFB] Tech Group's 'spinning' of IPO shares violated NASD Rule 3060, which
prohibits members and associated persons from giving gratuities in excess of $100 to
anyone 'in relation to the business of the employer of the recipient.'").
261 See, e.g., In re Black & Co., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-3460, 1974 SEC
LEXIS 3633, at *30-*49 (July 12, 1974) (finding that the allocation of a hot IPO
constituted a gratuity, notwithstanding the fact that the share allocation was bought
and paid for).
262 In addition, the use of existing tools such as NASD Rule 3060 or the
corporate opportunities or agency law doctrines noted above forces the problem of
spinning into doctrinal paradigms that do not necessarily respond to the connection
between spinning and underpricing nor to the subtle wealth-transfer dynamics
involved in the receipt of a spinning allocation. See supra Part III.C.
263 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 238, at 11.
2" Although it is tempting to answer that underwriters ought to be made to
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costs could be avoided by barring individual allocations
altogether. This suggestion is outlined in the next section.
C. A Proposal
The harm of spinning is that the receipt of hot IPO
allocations may induce some individuals to breach their
fiduciary duties. Although this Article has focused primarily on
the problem of managers who are induced to underprice their
offerings, there are a wide variety of other market participants
who may be induced to breach their fiduciary obligations.2" It is
therefore difficult, even in an academic treatment far removed
from the time pressure of investment banking allocation
decisions, to account for all of the potential conflicts that an
individual purchaser may have. As a result, the most efficient
way to control the harm may be to eliminate, or at least
severely limit, individual participation in IPO allocations.
Eliminating the role of individual investors in hot
offerings may increase the integrity of the capital markets
without significantly increasing the cost of capital. This could
be accomplished by phasing out the "retail pot" as IPOs become
oversubscribed. The taint of corruption - that is, shares going
to Bernie Ebbers rather than to you or me - would thus be
eliminated from the IPO process as the stock of shares from
which spinning allocations are drawn disappeared.
Furthermore, barring individual allocations and, in doing so,
eliminating the possibility of spinning, would effectively
remove a key motivation for underpricing. Underpricing might
persist, but only at the levels necessary to reward institutions
for truthfully revealing demand." The large underpricing
spreads of the late 1990s, which grew as spinning became an
increasingly common practice,"7 would no longer be necessary
or possible as the source of the side payment was effectively
taken away, thereby increasing the efficiency of the capital-
raising process.
Notwithstanding its near certain effectiveness at
removing the actual source of corruption from the IPO market,
bear the costs of spinning, it is important to note that increasing underwriters' costs
will ultimately increase the issuer's cost of capital since underwriters will seek to pass
costs back to issuers and, ultimately, their shareholders.
m See supra Part II.B (listing a variety of quid pro quo relationships which
may be engaged in by investment bankers allocating IPO shares).
2 See supra Part III.A.4.
27 See supra Part III.C.
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the elimination of individual investors from heavily
oversubscribed IPOs is a somewhat ironic solution.' It solves
the structural defects of the IPO process by exacerbating the
individual investor's most common complaint about the process
- that is, I didn't get any. Eliminating the retail pot not only
eliminates the ability of underwriters to ingratiate themselves
with the likes of Bernie Ebbers, it also eliminates the ability of
you and me directly to subscribe to hot public offerings. No
individual could get the shares of hot IPOs.269 They would all go,
instead, to the pension funds of California, New York, and
other states, to Vanguard and Fidelity, and other institutional
investors. The exclusion of individuals from these investment
opportunities will not be popular with individuals who, for one
reason or another, want to participate in public offerings,
making the proposal particularly unlikely to be adopted by
reformers seeking to cast themselves as champions of the
average investor.270
But the exclusion of individuals is apparent only.
Individuals, after all, are the beneficial owners of institutional
investment funds. They are the state employees and mutual
fund holders that profit at the end of the day when these
institutions flip their IPO shares for gains. At this level, much
of the distinction between individuals and institutions
crumbles since institutions invest for individuals. Furthermore,
forcing individuals to invest in IPOs through institutions would
2M It is unclear how often IPOs are sufficiently oversubscribed to eliminate
the role of individual investors. Moreover, the elimination of retail investors may
exacerbate certain liquidity and holding structure concerns. Issuers tend to favor
diffuse ownership and, relatedly, a liquid aftermarket for their shares. As one
entrepreneur explained:
The reason we've crisscrossed the country and are trying to visit as many
institutional investors as possible is clear to me: We want to spread out the
shares as widely as possible so that too many shares don't get concentrated in
the hands of too few institutions. Thinly traded stocks have great volatility.
Mike Mills, A Digital Age Rite: The IPO Roadshow, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1999, at H1.
It is possible, however, that liquidity concerns would be naturally assuaged when
institutions flipped their shares to individuals.
269 The proposal to improve the offering process by limiting or eliminating
allocations to individuals is similar to proposals to improve securities regulation by
regulating investor sophistication rather than issuer disclosure. See, e.g., Stephen
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 280
(2000). See also Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003)
(making the case for regulation by default rules that sophisticated parties - those least
likely to be susceptible to costly errors attributable to cognitive bias or bounded
rationality - may avoid).
270 See supra note 15 (comparing New York Attorney General Spitzer and
United States Senator Oxley as champions of the average investor).
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achieve other salutary goals such as encouraging
diversification and eliminating unsystematic risk from the
investment portfolios of investors who may not be sufficiently
sophisticated or sufficiently wealthy to eliminate it
themselves. 1 Finally, objectors to the exclusion of individuals
from the IPO allocation process are in the odd position of
asserting the individual rights of the wealthy - that is, those
investors with enough wealth and leisure to research and
invest in individual securities without regard either to the
opportunity costs or transaction costs associated with
managing a brokerage account - over efficiency in the capital
markets and the interests of those investors who are not
sufficiently sophisticated or sufficiently wealthy to attain
diversification on their own.
Simply stated, if underwriters could not allocate hot
issues to individual investors, many of the dubious quid pro
quo relationships involved in spinning would be eliminated.
Investment bankers could no longer seek to curry favor with
the wealthy and the powerful over the average investor. All
investors would be forced to participate on equal footing, as
institutional fund-holders or, alternatively, as aftermarket
buyers. Because these wealth-creating quid pro quo
arrangements would no longer be available to underwriters,272
their self-interested incentives to underprice IPOs would be
diminished, and IPOs would be priced closer to aftermarket
demand, perhaps with a narrow discount to induce
institutional buying."'
Although this proposal may be politically unfeasible due
to individual investors' enthusiasm for hot IPOs, it is offered
here to emphasize an element of the problem - the centrality of
the connection between spinning and underpricing - that other
regulatory proposals avoid or gloss over,74 and to illuminate the
interests of and conflicts between the parties with respect to
spinning and underpricing.
271 See generally RONALD J. GILsON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 89-94 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining diversification).
272 Quid pro quo allocations to institutions are already regulated and
generally banned. See supra notes 36-39 (discussing the NASD's Free-Riding and
Withholding Rules) and note 40 (discussing the prosecutions of CSFB and other
investment banks for linking brokerage commissions to institutional allocations).
273 A narrow institutional discount is consistent with the investor reward
hypothesis discussed in Part III.A.4.
274 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Article explored one of the controversies arising
from the stock market boom of the late 1990s - the spinning of
IPO shares - and developed a theoretical account of the
practice connecting it to the well-documented phenomenon of
IPO underpricing. Underpricing is both a means and an end of
spinning. Underpricing enables spinning by providing
underwriters with a ready supply of hot IPO shares. And
underpricing is an end of spinning when hot IPO allocations
are used to induce issuer-managers to underprice their own
offerings. This Article found support for the link between
spinning and underpricing in the literature of financial
economics and in an empirical survey of pricing in offerings
where spinning was reported to have occurred.
Having established this relationship between spinning
and underpricing, the Article went on to consider the proper
treatment of spinning under the law. At its core, spinning
involves a wealth transfer from the issuer to its manager, with
the underwriter merely serving as an intermediary. As a
result, the practice may be conceptualized as a breach of the
manager-recipient's duty of loyalty to the company.
Nevertheless, this is a harm to the corporation that, having
occurred, may be exceedingly costly to redress. Consequently,
the harm of spinning may be more effectively eliminated
through regulation of the offering process than through
shareholder litigation.
Finally, this Article proposed a simple regulatory
approach to the problem of spinning. Phasing out the right of
individual investors to participate in offerings that had become
significantly oversubscribed would solve the problem of
spinning and, at the same time, eliminate a significant
motivation for underpricing. The irony of this solution,
however, is that it may fix the problem while failing to appease
the most significant parties in interest to the offering process.
The proposal suits neither underwriters, who might prefer to
maintain the ability to generate goodwill through their
allocation practices, nor issuer-managers, who might like to
continue receiving the allocations, nor individual investors,
who might simply want the opportunity to share in the gains
associated with flipping a hot IPO allocation. The proposal
would, however, protect the interests of issuers generally, by
increasing offering proceeds, while also protecting those pre-
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IPO shareholders who are most likely to be harmed by
spinning and the underpricing that it entails.
Regardless of the feasibility of any particular approach,
the debate surrounding the proper regulatory solution to the
problem of spinning would be improved by emphasizing the
connection between spinning and underpricing. This Article
has sought to contribute to that debate by illuminating that
link as well as the subtle wealth transfer dynamics that the
practice of spinning sets in motion.
